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I. INTRODUCTION
It is likely, that in coming years, executions will become routine in
* Associate Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law. BA. 1975, Ober-
lin College; J.D. 1978, Boston University, S.J.D. Candidate, Harvard Law School.
** B.S. 1982, Taylor University, J.D. 1985, Stetson University College of Law. Assis-
tant State Attorney, 13th Judicial Circuit, Tampa, Fla.
The authors would like to thank Robert Batey and Trevor Nagel, who pro-
vided valuable comments and criticisms throughout the completion of this re-
search. We would also like to acknowledge the work of Fred Graves, Louise
Petren, Veronica Richardson, and Connie Evans in the preparation of this Arti-
cle, and the generosity of Stetson College of Law, whose research grants made
this project possible.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:21
America. The number of persons currently under sentence of death
exceeds 1,400,1 more than a seven-fold increase in the population of
death row since 1955.2 Last year, twenty-one persons were actually
executed,3 and that number is expected to double in 1985.4 This resur-
gence in capital punishment is supported by every region of the coun-
try and-with the notable exception of racial minorities--every
segment of the population.5 Contrary to the early hopes of abolition-
ists, there has been no public revulsion to the fact of capital
punishment. 6
The quickening pace of executions has been facilitated by the ex-
haustion of legal challenges available to death-row inmates. In an in-
creasing number of cases, the protracted process of appellate and post-
conviction review has simply spent itself.7 And, through an activist
review of capital cases, the Supreme Court has refined the jurispru-
dence of death so as to foreclose most generic attacks on the process of
capital sentencing.S
A few generic attacks do remain, however, and the most promising
of these is the challenge to so-called "death-qualified" juries.9 In al-
l. Silas, The Death Penalty, 71 A.B.A. J., April 1985 at 48, 52.
2. In 1955, fewer than 200 persons were under sentence of death in the United
States. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUN-
IsHMENT 1982 1 (1984). As of December 1984, that number stood at 1474. See
Silas, supra note 1, at 52.
3. Silas, supra note 1, at 49.
4. Id. at 48.
5. A recent survey indicates that 66 percent of the American public supports imposi-
tion of the death penalty for the crime of murder. This support extends through-
out every age, educational, occupational, religious, political, and regional group
reported in the survey. Only 44 percent of all blacks surveyed supported capital
punishment, however, compared to 70 percent of white respondents. See BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS 1982 262-63 (1983).
6. See generally M. MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 107 (1973).
7. See Silas, supra note 1, at 48.
8. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844 (1985) (judge may exclude jurors op-
posed to imposition of capital punishment even though jurors' attitude not unmis-
takably clear); Pulley v. Harris, 464 U.S. 871 (1984) (state appellate courts not
obligated to review capital convictions to determine sentence's proportionality
with other sentences); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (expedited review
of habeas corpus decisions permissible).
9. The phase "death qualification" is often used to refer to two distinct challenges of
a juror's qualifications in capital cases. First, a juror may be challenged because
his attitude toward capital punishment renders him unable to act fairly and im-
partially in deciding guilt See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 n.21
(1968). Such "nullifiers" are not qualified to serve in any capacity at a capital
trial. Second, a juror may be disqualified because his attitude toward capital pun-
ishment renders him unable, under any circumstances, to impose the death pen-
alty, even though he could adjudicate guilt impartially. Id-
Throughout this Article, the phrase "death qualification" will be used to refer
EMPIRICAL CHALLENGE
most all states authorizing capital punishment, juries are purged of
prospective jurors who confess an inability to impose the death pen-
alty should the defendant be convicted.10 This exclusion occurs even
though these jurors demonstrate an ability to adjudicate impartially
the guilt of the defendant, and even though there is a separate sen-
tencing proceeding where death penalty opponents could be replaced
by alternate jurors.-'
Though a staple of capital trials, the process of death qualification
has long raised suspicions that the resulting jury is more prone to con-
vict.1 2 The excluded juror's predisposition to reject a capital sentence,
it is argued, is not an isolated phenomenon. Clustered with this pre-
disposition are a variety of attitudes and characteristics that produce a
juror more favorable to criminal defendants.13 The right to exclude
these jurors through death qualification effectively empowers the
prosecution to mold a more conviction-prone jury, under the guise of
selecting a jury that might impose the death penalty if the defendant
were convicted of first-degree murder. In its worst manifestation, the
process of death qualification is thought to threaten the gravest error
to the process of screening the second group of jurors described above, and the
jurors themselves will be referred to variously as "excudable jurors" or, occasion-
ally, "excludables." Unless the group of jurors designated as nullifiers is specifi-
cally referred to, it shall be assumed that such nullifiers are not part of the jury
pool and have been properly screened.
Finally, a third group of jurors--"scrupled" jurors-consist of those jurors
who oppose capital punishment but who have the ability both to adjudicate guilt
impartially and to consider imposition of the death penalty. These jurors may not
be disqualified from service on capital juries. See id. at 521-22. Unless otherwise
stated, it is presumed that capital juries are not screened of scrupled jurors.
10. See White, Death-Qualified Juries: The "Prosecution-Proneness"ArgumentReex-
amined, 41 U. PiTT. L. REv. 353, 402 n.250 (1980).
11. All modern statutory schemes provide for bifurcated proceedings in which the
guilt and penalty decisions are made separately. See Gillers, Deciding Who Dies,
129 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 101-19 (1980). Usually it is the jury that determines the
sentence in capital cases, although a small number of states reserve that decision
for the judge. See icL As one commentator has argued persuasively, there is little
justification for removing excludable jurors when the jury lacks ultimate author-
ity to impose a death sentence. See Winick, Witherspoon in Florida: Reflections
on the Challenge for Cause of Jurors in Capital Cases in a State in Which the
Judge Makes the Sentencing Decision, 37 U. MIm L. REv. 825 (1983).
12. See, e.g., Cowan, Thompson & Ellsworth, The Fffects of Death Qualification on
Jurors' Disposition to Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 53 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Cowan]; Jurow, New Data on the Effect of a
"Death Qualifzed" Jury on the Guilt Determination Process, 84 HARV. L. REv.
567 (1971); Oberer, Does Disqualifcation of Jurors for Scruples Against Capital
Punishment Constitute Denial of Fair Trial on Issue of Guilt?, 39 TEx. L. REV.
545 (1961).
13. For an elaborate discussion of the psycho-social theories on this subject, see Se-
quin & Horowitz, The Effects of Death Qualification on Juror and Jury Decision-
ing: An Analysis from Three Perspectives, 8 L. & PSYCHOLOGY REV. 49 (1984).
19861
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
in our system of criminal justice: the conviction of an innocent person
and the imposition of the irreparable penalty of death.
Whether the death-qualified jury is conviction prone is ultimately
an empirical question. This was implicitly recognized in Witherspoon
v. illinois,14 where the Supreme Court found existing empirical evi-
dence "too tentative and fragmentary to establish that jurors not op-
posed to the death penalty tend to favor the prosecution in the
determination of guilt."15 While ostensibly a rejection of the social
science claim then presented, Witherspoon admitted the possibility
that subsequent research might rehabilitate the "fragmentary" record
before it, thus requiring a reexamination of the conviction-proneness
argument at a later time.' 6
The response of the social science community to the perceived invi-
tation of Witherspoon has been exceptional. In the seventeen years
following Witherspoon, death qualification has been one of the most
studied subjects in the area of sociological jurisprudence.17 The prod-
14. 39 U.S. 510 (1968). In Witherspoon, the Court invalidated under the fourteenth
amendment the procedure whereby scrupled jurors, see supra note 9, were ex-
cluded from capital trials. The Court found that juries so constituted denied the
accused the right to trial by an impartial jury as to the determination of the sen-
tence. The Court was not persuaded, however, that the conviction of the accused
was tainted by the exclusion of scrupled jurors, and thus only Witherspoon's sen-
tence was inalidated. As a practical matter, the holding in Witherspoon pro-
scribed the future exclusion of scrupled jurors from any aspect of the capital trial,
since it is universal practice to use the same jury for both adjudication of guilt and
sentencing.
15. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 517 (1968). Although the quoted statement
was made in response to Witherspoon's argument that juries screened of scrupled
jurors are prone to convict, the Court made clear that the same issue was pre-
served regarding the screening of excludable jurors (as defined in supra note 9).
Regarding a jury screened of excludable jurors, the Court observed:
A defendant convicted by such a jury in some futie case might still
attempt to establish that the jury was less than neutral with respect to
guilt. If he were to succeed in that effort, the question would then arise
whether the State's interest in submitting the penalty issue to a jury ca-
pable of imposing capital punishment may be vindicated at the expense
of the defendant's interest in a completely fair determination of guilt or
innocence-given the possibility of accommodating both interests by
means of a fiburcated trial, using one jury to decide guilt and another to
fix punishment. That problem is not presented here, however, and we
intimate no view as to its proper resolution.
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 n.18 (1968) (emphasis in original).
16. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 n.18 (1968).
17. See, e.g., Bernard & Dwyer, Witherspoon v. illinois: The Court Was Right, 8 L. &
PSYCHOLOGY REV. 105 (1984); Bronson, Does the Exclusion of Scrupled Jurors in
Capital Cases Made the Jury More Likely to Convict? Some Evidence from Cali-
fornia, 3 WOODROW WILSON L.J. 11 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Bronson II & III];
Bronson, On the Conviction Proneness and Representativeness of the Death-Qual-
ified Jury: An Empirical Study of Colorado Veniremen, 42 U. COLO. L. REv. 1
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Bronson I]; Cowan, supra note 12; Fitzgerald & Ells-
worth, Due Process vs. Crime ControL Death Qualifwation and Jury Attitudes, 8
[Vol. 64:21
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uct is more than a dozen reported investigations which, in the over-
whelming consensus of commentators, have confirmed three
empirical hypotheses: (1) jurors excluded because of their inability to
impose the death penalty are more attitudinally disposed to favor the
accused than are non-excluded jurors; (2) excluded jurors are more
likely to be black or female than non-excluded jurors; and (3) ex-
cluded jurors are more likely to actually acquit the accused than are
non-excluded jurors.' 8
The Witherspoon issue, as a consequence of the developing empiri-
cal evidence, as well as evolution in constitutional doctrine,19 has been
transmuted into two socio-legal claims. First, it is claimed that the
death-qualified jury has characteristics so significantly different from
those of nonqualified juries that the sixth amendment right to a jury
drawn from a "fair cross section" of the community is violated.20 Sec-
ond, it is claimed that the death-qualified jury is more conviction
prone-a response to the historical inquiry framed in Witherspoon-
and thus violative of the sixth and fourteen amendment guarantees of
an impartial jury.2 '
As the challenge to death qualification has moved from the re-
search journals to the courts, consensus has failed: most state and fed-
eral courts have rejected the empirical attack upon death
qualification.22 In more than a score of decisions, courts have dis-
L. & Hum. BEHAV. 31 (1984); Harris, Louis & Associates, Study No. 2016 (1971)
(unpublished study) [hereinafter cited as Harris Study]; Kadane, After Hovey: A
Note on Taking Account of the Automatic Death Penalty Jurors, 8 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 115 (1984); Precision Research, Survey No. 1286 (1981) (unpublished man-
uscript).
For empirical studies addressing the distinctive characteristics of scrupled, as
distinct from death-qualified jurors (see supra note 9, see H. ZEISEL, SOME DATA
ON JUROR ATrrruDEs TOwARD CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1968); Goldberg, Toward
Expansion of Witherspoon: Capital Scruples, Jury Bias, and The Use of Psycho-
logical Data to Raise Presumptions in the Law, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 53
(1970); Wilson, Belief in Capital Punishment and Jury Performance (1964) (un-
published manuscript, available at University of Texas).
18. For summaries of and commentary on the current research, see Colussi, The Un-
constitutionality of Death Qualifying a Jury Prior to the Determination of Guil"
The Fair-Cross-Section Requirement in Capital Cases, 15 CREIGHTON L. REV. 595
(1982); Gross, Determining the Neutrality of Death-Qualifed Juries: Judicial
Appraisal of Empirical Data, 8 L. & Hum. Behav. 7 (1984); Haney, Juries and the
Death Penalty: Readdressing the Witherspoon Question, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 512
(1980); White, supra note 10.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 31-36.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 24-95.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 96-135.
22. See, e.g., Matteson v. King, 751 F.2d 1432 (5th Cir. 1985); Briley v. Booker, 746 F.2d
225 (4th Cir. 1984); Keeten v. Garrison, 742 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1984); Corn v. Zant,
708 F.2d 549 (11th Cir. 1983), reh'g denied, 714 F.2d 159, cert denied, 104 S. Ct.
2670 (1984); Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1981), modified, 671 F.2d 858
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882 (1982); Brinlee v. Crisp, 608 F.2d 839 (10th Cir. 1979),
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missed the empirical claims for reasons ranging from methodological
misgivings to doubts as to whether the social science evidence has
legal significance at all. Reviewing these decisions, one encounters
two familiar and chronic problems in the judicial effort to assess social
science claims. The first is the judiciary's own tentativeness and skep-
ticism in evaluating complex empirical evidence. This tentativeness
often invites regression into doctrinal intransigence and disingenuity,
as the courts grasp for ways to disbelieve what the social scientist are
telling them. The second problem is the failure of social scientists to
fully translate the empirical evidence into appropriate normative is-
sues. Empirical evidence seldom speaks for itself; it requires, instead,
refinement and interpretation whereby the courts are made aware of
the possible value choices.23 This process has frequently been slighted
in the challenge to death qualification, as the empirical evidence has
been characterized as leading ineluctably to specific legal and norma-
tive judgments. The cumulative result is a fundamental unresponsive-
ness: the courts and the social scientists seem seldom to have spoken
to each other or to have joined issue. As a consequence, the sharp
divergence in judicial and social science opinion seems all too
predictable.
In the following discussion we reexamine the empirical evidence
and the normative questions presented in the challenge to death quali-
fication. While we conclude that the current procedure for death
qualification should be changed, our interpretation of the empirical
claims and their significance diverges from that of most of the social
science commentary. The evidence on death qualification, we shall
maintain, fails to establish any compelling, unambiguous cause of ac-
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1047 (1980); Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th
Cir. 1978), cert denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979); United States ex. rel. Clark v. Fike,
538 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1064 (1977); McClesky v. Zant,
580 F. Supp. 338 (N.D. Ga. 1984), modified, 753 F.2d 877 (11th Cir. 1985); Martin v.
Blackburn, 521 F. Supp. 685 (E.D. La. 1981), affd, 711 F.2d 1273 (5th Cir. 1981);
Craig v. Wyse, 373 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Colo. 1974); Taylor v. Slayton, 341 F. Supp.
489 (W.D. Va. 1972); State v. Ramirez, 116 Ariz. 259, 569 P.2d 201 (1977); People v.
Fields, 35 Cal. 3d 329, 673 P.2d 680, 197 Cal. Rptr. 803 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 267 (1985); Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 616 P.2d 1301, 168 Cal. Rptr.
128 (1980); Corn v. State, 240 Ga. 130, 240 S.E.2d 694 (1977), cert denied, 436 U.S.
914 (1978); Ginnings v. State, 506 S.W.2d 422 (Mo. 1974); State v. Bayless, 48 Ohio
St. 2d 73, 357 N.E.2d 1035 (1976); Commonwealth v. Kenney, 449 Pa. 562, 297 A.2d
794 (1972); Hunter v. State, 496 S.W.2d 900 (Tenn. 1972); Solis v. State, 492 S.W.2d
561 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); State v. Golladay, 78 Wash. 2d 121, 470 P.2d 191 (1970).
The two exceptions to the pattern of rejection are Keeten v. Garrison, 578 F.
Supp. 1164 (W.D.N.C. 1984), rev'd, 742 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1984), and Grigsby v.
Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273 (E.D. Ark. 1983), affd, 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985), cert
granted sub nom Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 59 (1985). Although Keeten has
been reversed, Grigsby remains binding precedent in the eighth circuit.
23. See Kalven, The Quest for the Middle Range: Empirical Inquiry and Legal Pol-
icy, in LAW IN A CHANGING AMERICA 56, 66-69 (G. Hazard ed. 1968).
[Vol. 64:21
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tion under existing constitutional doctrine. In this respect, must of
the empirical evidence on death qualification has been overinterpreted
by its proponents. Nonetheless, we conclude that even a more re-
strained interpretation of the evidence gives rise to constitutional
value choices that, in the greater context of our criminal justice sys-
tem, should prompt the courts to amend the current process of death
qualification.
In Section II of this Article, we reexamine the evidence concerning
the effects of death qualification on the characteristics of resulting
petit juries. A review of that evidence, we shall maintain, reveals ro-
bust and consistent support for the claim that death-qualified juries
are attitudinally and demographically different from non-qualified ju-
ries. The magnitude of this effect, however, is diluted substantially by
the relatively small proportion of excludable jurors in the eligible jury
populations, and by the relative degree of differences between quali-
fied and non-qualified juries. The resulting effect thus falls short of
the modicum of proof required by the courts in related challenges to
jury selection procedures. Viewed as samples of community attitudes
and characteristics, death-qualified juries appear sufficiently represen-
tative of their communities to withstand constitutional scrutiny under
contemporary standards.
The evidence on the conviction proneness of death-qualified juries,
by contrast, presents a less tractable and less precedented issue. As
we shall discuss in Section III of this Article, there is ample evidence
that death-qualified juries will at times decide cases differently, even
though it is impossible to measure the magnitude of this difference.
The difference will probably arise in a relatively small percentage of
"close" cases, where death-qualified juries will be more prone to con-
vict. Such close cases, in which death qualification matters, will be
undetectable at trial or on appeal, and hence uncorrectable on a case-
by-case basis. These cases are more likely to be those in which the
defendant is either convicted of a lesser degree of homicide or sen-
tenced to imprisonment rather than death. Furthermore, the differ-
ence in the outcome of death-qualified cases will result even though
the conviction-prone jury is "impartial" in the accepted legal sense of
the term, and even though the outcome is plausibly the correct one.
Thus, courts probably could, in good legal conscience, sustain the
current process of death qualification against conventional constitu-
tional challenge. There are overriding considerations, however, that
militate against this response. The challenged procedure of death
qualification is but part of a larger juror selection process that is pecu-
liar to capital case adjudication. Through the formal and informal
workings of this process, substantial segments of the community are
withdrawn from jury service, and the resulting juries bear less and
less resemblance to the populations from which they are drawn. This
1986]
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skewing of the jury panel, moreover, seems inevitably a skewing in
the single direction of conviction, even if the extent of the effect is
unmeasurable.
A certain amount of jury manipulation is, admittedly, the neces-
sary price for implementing capital punishment in a society where
large minorities are opposed to the death penalty. At some point,
however, the criminal justice system must examine itself critically and
ask whether its commitment to infliction of the death penalty should
yield to the preservation of the idea of representative juries. The chal-
lenge to death qualification, we contend, presents such a point. There
are available procedural alternatives to the present scheme of death
qualification that should be tried, and the unknown costs of proce-
dural change should not outweigh the known costs of complacency.
Constitutional values, if not constitutional precedent, counsel the wis-
dom of change.
II. COMMUNITY REPRESENTATION ON THE DEATH-
QUALIFIED JURY
In Witherspoon v. Illinois, the Court's expressed concern was
whether detah-qualified juries are more prone to convict.24 The re-
search that followed Witherspoon, however, most often addressed the
different, if related, question of whether death-qualified juries have
distinctive attitudinal and behavioral characteristics.2 5 This trend in
research strategy can best be understood as a product of both theoreti-
cal and pragmatic concerns. At the time Witherspoon was decided,
there was widespread (albeit tentative) acceptance of the theory that
human behavior is often predictable from attitudes, characteristics,
and personality types. This paradigm generated particular interest in
the law and social science community, where researchers attempted to
model juror behavior from various juror characteristics. 26
This paradigm also had special relevance to the problem of death
qualification. Even in 1968, surveys of death-qualified jurors were re-
vealing consistent differences in their attitudes and characteristics. 27
Such jurors, it appeared, were more likely to be "authoritarian" per-
sonality types, holding more favorable attitudes toward crime control
24. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 n.18 (1968).
25. See supra note 17.
26. See generally W. LoH, SOCIAL REsEARCH IN THE JUDICIAL PROCEss 401-03 (1984);
Boehr, Mr. Prejudice, Miss Sympathy & The Authoritarian Personality: An Ap-
plication of Psychological Measuring Techniques to the Problem of Jury Bias,
1968 Wis. L. REv. 734; Mitchell & Byrne, The Defendant's Dilemma.. Effects of
Jurors'Attitudes and Authoritarianism on Judicial Decisions, 25 J. PERS. & Soc.
PSYCHOLOGY 123 (1973).
27. See, e.g., H. ZEISEL, supra note 17; Goldberg, supra note 17; Wilson, supra note 17.




methods and the state, and less favorable attitudes toward due process
concerns and the criminally accused.28 The prevailing behavioral the-
ory at the time of Witherspoon thus suggested that these discernible
differences in the characteristics of death-qualified jurors were evi-
dence of conviction proneness. Moreover, the proof of conviction
proneness through the accumulation of data on juror characteristics
had methodological advantages. Such data could be collected at rela-
tively modest cost, could be collected for larger segments of the popu-
lation, and could be analyzed by well-developed statistical
techniques. 29 Alternative strategies for proving the phenomenon of
conviction proneness-the study of actual juror behavior or the stimu-
lation of that behavior-seemed less feasible economically and
methodologically.30
Not surprisingly then, the principal research findings in the decade
following Witherspoon consisted of survey and questionnaire data.
But with the Supreme Court's 1975 decision in Taylor v. Louisiana,31
this indirect proof of conviction proneness was to acquire independent
legal significance. In Taylor, the court announced that state jury se-
lection procedures might violate the sixth amendment simply because
resulting juries have characteristics that differ from those of the popu-
lation from which they are drawn.32 Thus, jury selection procedures
resulting in "substantial" underrepresentation of blacks, hispanics,
and women were invalidated as violations of the "fair-cross-section"
requirement, even in the absence of actual proof that the resulting
juries functioned differently or were more conviction prone.33
The decision in Taylor was to work a transformation in the empiri-
cal attack on death qualification. Recent challenges to death qualifica-
28. See H. ZEISEL, supra note 17; Goldberg, supra note 17; Wilson, supra note 17.
29. See generally D. BALDus & J. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION
(1980); H. BARKSDALE, THE USES OF SURVEY RESEARCH FINDINGS AS LEGAL EVI-
DENCE (1957); W. LOH, supra note 26, at 409-11; D. VINSON & P. ANTHONY, SOCIAL
SCIENCE RESEARCH METHODS FOR LITIGATION 66-69 (1985); JURYWORK: SYSTEM-
ATIC TECHNIQUES 9-14 to 9-18 (E. Krauss & B. Bonora eds. 1984).
30. See infra text accompanying notes 105-10. See generally D. VINSON & P.
ANTHONY, supra note 29, at 443-48.
31. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
32. Id. at 532 (quoting Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193-94 (1946)). The
Court at one point recognized that the inclusion of women jurors "may not...
make an iota of difference," but nonetheless was willing to invalidate the state's
procedure that lead to the under-inclusion of women jurors. Id This absence of
any evidence of unfairness or prejudice prompted Justice Rehnquist to dissent.
I& at 538-39, 543 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Subsequent decisions by the Court
indicate that it will continue to invalidate jury selection procedures without re-
quiring actual proof of behavioral effects. See, e.g., Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S.
357 (1979); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
33. See, e.g., Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979) (women); Castaneda v. Partida,




tion have continued to argue the conviction proneness of qualified
juries, but the emphasis has often shifted to the distinctive character-
istics of those juries, which allegedly underrepresent the variety of
constituencies and concerns found in the communities from which
they are drawn. In essence, this strategy has reduced the burden of
proving a casual link between juror characteristics and juror behavior:
given a demonstrable alteration in the profile of juror characteristics,
and suggestive evidence that this alteration might affect the outcome
in jury trials, actual proof that death-qualified juries are conviction
prone need not to be established under the more demanding conven-
tions of social science. This transformation in the empirical challenge
to death qualification is illustrated by the single circuit court opinion
sustaining that challenge. In Grigsby v. Mabry,34 the eighth circuit
found the exclusion of capital opponents to be a violation of the "fair-
cross-section" requirement of the sixth amendment, even though it
took pains to support its opinion with evidence that death-qualified
juries are more prone to convict.3 5 As noted by the dissent in Gribsby,
the related arguments of fair-cross-section and conviction proneness
appears to have emerged.36
A. Establishing a Fair-Cross-Section Violation
In assessing a challenge to jury selection procedures under the fair-
cross-section doctrine, the Court has required the proof of three
elements:
In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section require-
ment, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a
"distinctive" group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group
in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation
to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this under-
representation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection
process.3 7
Application of the Duren test in a typical fair-cross-section chal-
lenge presents no definitional problems; the controversy usually cen-
ters on the sufficiency of the statistical proof.38 Invocation of this
challenge in the context of death qualification, by comparison, raises
novel interpretive issues. One such issue, which has led to considera-
34. 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985) cerL granted sub nom Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct.
59 (1985).
35. For example, while applying the analytical test for challenges under the "fair-
cross-section" doctrine, see infra text accompanying note 37, the court stated that
the "fundamental issue" was the conviction proneness of death qualified juries.
Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 232 (8th Cir. 1985).
36. Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 244 n.2 (8th Cir. 1985) (Gibson, J., dissenting).
37. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).
38. See generally Beale, Integrating Statistical Evidence and Legal Theory to Chal-
lenge the Selection of Grand and Petit Jurors, 46 L. & Contemp. Probs., Autumn
1983, at 269. See also infra text accompanying notes 57-58.
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ble controversy and confusion in the lower courts, is whether excluda-
ble jurors are a distinctive, cognizable group entitled to protection
under the sixth amendment.39 A second issue, repeatedly miscon-
ceived by those courts applying the Duren test to excludable jurors,
concerns the appropriate comparison for determining whether exclud-
able jurors are "fairly and reasonably" represented on death-qualified
juries.40 Judicial error in addressing both these issues, we maintain,
has precluded accurate interpretation of the empirical evidence relat-
ing to the particular characteristics of death-qualified jurors.
Several courts have refused to recognize excludable jurors as a cog-
nizable group under the fair-cross-section doctrine. The fourth and
fifth circuits have justified their refusal on the ground that excludable
jurors are disqualified from jury service because of their inability to
fulfill a legal responsibility to consider imposition of the death pen-
alty.41 This disqualification, it is argued, removes excludable jurors
from the larger population of legitimate jurors entitled to protection
under the sixth amendment.42 According to this view, excludable ju-
rors have no cognizable legal status under the sixth amendment; thus
there is no need to inquire further under the Duren standard.43
39. Compare Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 231 (8th Cir. 1985); Keeten v. Garrison,
578 F. Supp. 1164, 1181-82 (W.D.N.C. 1984), rev'd, 742 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1984);
People v. Fields, 35 Cal. 3d 329, 378-81, 673 P.2d 680,711-14,197 Cal. Rptr. 803, 835-
37, (1984) (Bird, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 267 (1985), with Grigsby
v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 244-47 (8th Cir. 1985) (Gibson, J., dissenting); Keeten v.
Garrison, 742 F.2d 129, 133-34 (4th Cir. 1984); People v. Fields, 35 Cal. 3d 329, 347-
49, 673 P.2d 680, 690-92, 197 Cal. Rptr. 803, 813-815 (1984), cert denied, 105 S. Ct.
267 (1985).
40. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., Keeten v. Garrison, 742 F.2d 129, 133 (4th Cir. 1984) (citing Lockett v.
Ohio 438 U.S. 586, 596-97 (1978)) ("Although the right to a jury trial includes the
right to a jury venire drawn from a representative cross-section of the commu-
nity, it does not include the right to be tried by jurors who are unable or unwill-
ing to follow the law and the instructions of the trial judge in a capital case.");
Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573, 582 (5th Cir. 1981) (unalterable opposition to
capital punishment is a legitimate disqualification even though it reduces the pos-
sibility of achieving a true cross-section on the particular jury).
42. See, e.g., supra note 41.
43. This position has been supplemented by an additional argument, which also dis-
poses of the fair-cross-section argument without analysis of the empirical data.
The court in Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1981), modified, 671 F.2d
858 (5th Cir. 1982), suggested that the fair-cross-section doctrine guarantees the
right to a representative jury venire (i.e., the jury pool before juror qualification
in specific cases) but not the right to representative juries. 1d. at 583 n.26. This
position rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of the fair-cross-section doc-
trine. Concededly, a capital defendant is "not entitled to a jury of any particular
composition" or to a jury that exactly replicates the community profile. Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975) (citations omitted). Random juror selection
and the small size of juries, among other causes, will preclude exact duplication of
the community profile. See Winick, Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge Prac-
tices in Capital Cases: An Empirical Study and a Constitutional Analysis, 81
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This view is not only peculiarly formalistic, it is irreconcilable with
Witherspoon itself. Witherspoon expressly recognized that the pro-
priety of death qualification presents distinctive issues depending on
whether the guilt or the penalty phase of a trial is examined.44 The
very point of the challenge to death qualification under Witherspoon
is that the two phases are discrete events: one in which death qualifi-
cation is appropriate, and the other in which it may be questionable.
In fact, the specific relief granted in Witherspoon distinguished be-
tween the constitutional impact of juror exclusion on convictions and
sentences.45 Therefore, the lower courts' refusal to examine the im-
pact of death qualification on the guilt-determination phase of a trial,
based on the asserted ground that excludable jurors are unfit to serve
during the sentencing phase, begs the legal question. At most, the
practical interrelatedness of the guilt and penalty phases might ulti-
mately justify total exclusion from jury service; it does not obviate the
need for constitutional scrutiny in the first instance.
A more substantial objection to the cognizability of excludable ju-
rors under Duren is that they lack any distinct identity as a commu-
nity group. Excludable jurors, it is noted, acquire their distinction in a
limited judicial setting and are otherwise a nondescript, heterogene-
MICH. L. REv. 1, 65-66 (1982). But the fact that excludable jurors are part of the
original jury venire, and removed later at trial, is practically irrelevant. The ex-
cludable juror's attitude toward capital punishment is an automatic ground for
exclusion, and produces the same type of effect on subsequent juries as would, for
example, the deletion of women from jury venires. The only distinction is that
death qualification requires an in-court determination since, unlike gender, the
juror's attitude toward capital punishment is not readily ascertainable through
administrative communication. Thus, there is no functional distinction between
the screening of jurors through venire selection, and their screening through pre-
trial voir dire. Local juries as a group will suffer the same type of jury to commu-
nity representativeness. See Keeten v. Garrison, 578 F. Supp. 1164, 1183
(W.D.N.C. 1984), rev'd, 742 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1984); Colussi, supra note 18, at 611
("The Supreme Court has never found that the systematic exclusion must occur
at a particular point in the jury selection process.")
44. In Witherspoon, the Court stated that a defendant convicted by a death-qualified
jury:
in some future case might still attempt to establish that the jury was less
than neutral with respect to guilt. If he were to succeed in that effort,
the question would then arise whether the State's interest in submitting
the penalty issue to a jury capable of imposing capital punishment may
be vindicated at the expense of the defendant's interest in a completely
fair determination of guilt or innocence-given the possibility of accom-
modating both interests by means of a bifurcated trial, using one jury to
decide guilt and another to fix punishment.
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 n.18 (1968).
45. The Court expressly noted that its holding invalidated only the sentence, and not
the conviction of Witherspoon. Id. at n.21. This distinction was reiterated in the
companion case, Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 545 (1968).
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ous segment of the community.46 By comparison, those groups com-
monly protected under the fair-cross-section doctrine are discrete,
self-conscious parts of the community who are often historical victims
of governmental discrimination. Unlike excludable jurors, these pro-
tected groups may share a common outlook and experience, and their
underrepresentation on local juries implicates fundamental egalita-
rian and communitarian values.4 7
There is both shadow and substance to the argument stated above.
The attempt to distinguish excludable and protected jurors, based on
the latter's recognition in the community at large, misconceives the
purpose of the fair-cross-section doctrine. The doctrine is not an ap-
pendage to the equal protection clause. It safeguards the functioning
of the jury as much, if not more, than it secures the community status
of discrete minorities. 4S Nor does the underrepresentation of identifi-
able community groups present some special threat to the functioning
of juries that necessitates their special protection. At present, there is
weak evidence at best to indicate that identifiable demographic groups
46. See, e.g., People v. Fields, 35 Cal. 3d 329, 349, 673 P.2d 680, 692, 197 Cal. Rptr. 803,
814-15 (1984):
Persons who would not be willing to vote for the death penalty come
from diverse backgrounds and experiences, and may have diverse views
on all other matters.... They do not comprise a distinctive, self-con-
scious group; one's identity is defined in part by his or her gender, race,
religion, and other matters, but not generally by one's views on the sin-
gle question of whether one would vote against death if chosen as a juror
in a capital case.
See also Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 245-47 (8th Cir. 1985) (Gibson, J.,
dissenting).
47. See, e.g., People v. Fields, 35 Cal. 3d 329, 353, 673 P.2d 680, 694-95, 197 Cal. Rptr.
803, 818 (1984), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 267 (1985) ("Opponents of capital punish-
ment are not traditional victims of discrimination. Their exclusion from capital
juries is not a badge of servitude or an assertion of inferiority... nor a perpetua-
tion of stereotypes .... "); Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 244-47 (8th Cir. 1985)
(Gibson, J., dissenting).
48. The Court has articulated two principal concerns underlying the fair-cross-sec-
tion doctrine. First, the doctrine insures that juries reflect the community's
"qualities of human nature and varieties of human experience," Peters v. Kiff,
407 U.S. 493,503 (1972), that in turn may affect jury deliberation and verdicts. See
id, See also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 531-32 (1975). Second, the doctrine
preserves public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system by in-
suring that all segments of the community share in the administration of justice.
See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975). See also Thiel v. Southern Pa-
cific Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946):
Trial by jury presupposes a jury drawn from a pool broadly representa-
tive of the community as well as impartial in a specific case.... [Tihe
broad representative character of the jury should be maintained, partly
as assurance of a diffused impartiality, and partly because sharing in the
administration of justice is a phase of civil responsibility.
Id, at 227 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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bring distinctive behavioral and voting patterns to jury service.49 The
Court apparent to recognize this in Taylor v. Louisiana, when it con-
ceded that the effect of the exclusion of women from jury service is
unknown.50 Therefore, as a matter of constitutional policy, there is no
justification for denying protection to excludable jurors simply be-
cause they lack recognition in the non-judicial community. To the
contrary, if excludable jurors are proven to have distinctive character-
istics that affect the jury's function, they may have greater claim to
protection than conventional community groups.
Even if limitation of the fair-cross-section doctrine to conventional
community groups is unjustified by constitutional policy, there re-
mains a pragmatic concern that may be influencing the courts. The
variety of challenges to jury selection procedures has multiplied in re-
cent years, as the courts have been asked to scrutinize an array of ju-
ror qualifications ranging from age to job classifications.51 As a
consequence, the courts may legitimately fear the seeming limitless-
ness of the fair-cross-section doctrine, which threatens to transform
every jury selection criterion into a constitutionally cognizable group
identity.52
Yet the challenge to death qualification hardly seems the point at
which to draw arbitrary, if pragmatic, limits to the fair-cross-section
doctrine. The challenge to death qualification is unusual in that it
draws upon an extensive array of empirical studies that attempt to
demonstrate particular effects on the jury's operation.53 If anything,
recognition of the empirical challenge to death qualification would be
precedent that increases the burden of proof in other fair-cross-section
cases. The evidence on death qualification, moreover, goes to the very
impartiality of capital juries, a core component of the constitutional
right to trial by jury. Moreso than conventional community group
challenges to jury selection procedures,54 the challenge to death quali-
fication implicates those concerns that underlie the sixth amendment.
49. See generally R. HAsTIE, S. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY 140-42,
237-38 (1983); W. Loh, supra note 26.
50. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 530, 531-33 (1975).
51. See generally Winick, supra note 43, at 67-69; Zeigler, Young Adults as a Cogniza-
ble Group in Jury Selection, 76 MiCH. L. REv. 1045, 1057-61 (1978).
52. See Grigsby v. Mabry, 578 F.2d 226, 245-46 n.5 (8th Cir. 1985) (Gibson, J., dissent-
ing); Zeigler, supra note 51, at 1062 ("Courts may fear that if they find many
occupational and income groups cognizable, the presence and effectiveness of the
doctrine may inspire innumerable challenges to jury selection procedures.").
53. See Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273 (E.D. Ark. 1983), affd, 758 F.2d 226 (8th
Cir. 1985) (noting that in prior challenge to age qualifications, there was "no evi-
dence or empirical data" to demonstrate that excluded age group shared a "deci-
sional outlook"); Zeigler, supra note 51, at 1059-60 (observing that occupational,
educational and income groups have failed to establish their attitudinal
distinctiveness).
54. See supra note 49.
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Thus, neither judicial nor constitutional policy justifies the refusal to
extend the fair-cross-section doctrine to excludable jurors. If, as oppo-
nents of death qualification maintain, excludable jurors share distinc-
tive attitudes and characteristics that bear on their performance as
jurors, the Duren standard should apply.
Actual application of the Duren standard, however, has not proven
so simple. Even where courts have concluded that excludable jurors
have "distinctive" characteristics and thus are cognizable groups
under the sixth amendment, they have repeatedly erred in determin-
ing whether these distinctive characteristics are "fairly and reason-
ably" represented on death-qualification juries.5 5 The lower courts'
error results from the atypical manner in which the distinctiveness of
excludable jurors is manifested. When a challenge to jury selection is
brought by a conventional community group-women, for example-
the group is treated as sui generis; male jurors in the community, ac-
cordingly, are not thought competent to represent the female perspec-
tive. The adequacy of the representation of women on juries,
therefore, can be determined in a straightforward manner by compar-
ing their proportionality in the community with their proportionality
in local jury venires. The discovered difference in these proportions
reveals the adequacy of women's representation on local juries.56
Excludable jurors, by contrast, are somewhat fungible with non-
excludable jurors. That is, while excludable jurors as a group contain
more individuals with attitudes favorable to the defense, non-excluda-
ble jurors as a group also contain individuals with pro-defendant atti-
tudes.5 7 Therefore, a conventional comparison between the number of
excludables in the community and the number in the jury pool will
55. See, e.g., Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226,231-32 (8th Cir. 1985); Keeten v. Garrison,
578 F. Supp. 1164, 1182-83 (W.D. N.C. 1984), rev'd, 742 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1984);
People v. Fields, 35 Cal. 3d 329, 381 n.10, 673 P.2d 680, 714 n.10, 197 Cal. Rptr. 803,
838 n.10 (1984) (Bird, C.J., dissenting), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 267 (1195). See also
infra note 115.
56. See, e.g., Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357,364-66 (1979) (comparison of female pop-
ulation reported in census with female representation on jury venires); Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 524 (1975) (comparison of eligible female jurors with per-
centage of females on actual jury wheel). See generally Beale, supra note 38.
57. See infra text accompanying note 64. In this respect, both the district court and
appellate opinions in Grigsby v. Mabry are mistaken. These courts assumed that
excludable jurors have "distinctive" attitudes toward criminal justice that are not
represented by any other jury group. See Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273,
1283 (E.D. Ark. 1983). Thus, given the total elimination of excludable jurors
through death qualification, there is no "adequate representation" of these jurors
and their attitudes in resulting juries. Id at 1286. As demonstrated in the subse-
quent discussion, however, excludable jurors are not the exclusive representative
of attitudes favorable to criminal defendants, even though they may have "dis-
tinctively" large percentages of these attitudes in their group. Therefore, the
Grigsby analysis produces an incorrect measure of the attitudinal effects of death
qualification. See also infra note 58.
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overstate the magnitude of the reduction in attitudes (or characteris-
tics) resulting from death qualification. Since the goal is to protect the
representation of juror attitudes and characteristics-rather than to
protect one group (excludable jurors) that holds those attitudes and
characteristics-the relevant comparison is that between the propor-
tion of attitudes and characteristics on juries before and after death
qualification.58 It is the discovered difference in these proportions
that indicates the presence of an unconstitutional effect.
It thus can be seen that the challenge to death qualification under
the fair-cross-section doctrine requires variation on the typical statisti-
cal analysis. Excludable jurors are, in essence, surrogates for various
juror characteristics that are thought necessary to the proper opera-
tion of a jury. While the treatment of excludable jurors is, in the first
instance, the focus of judicial scrutiny, the jurors are not and need not
be protected for their own sake. In this respect, excludable jurors dif-
fer from those community groups who are the usual focus of constitu-
tional protection and who are protected, to some extent, because of
their community identity. This variation on conventional sixth
amendment analysis. however, should not obscure the fact that the
ultimate goal of the analysis is unvarying: to determine whether re-
sulting juries are functionally acceptable microcosms of the communi-
ties from which they are drawn.
B. The Representation of Community Attitudes on
Death-Qualified Juries
The most consistent finding yet produced by empirical studies of
death qualification is that excludable jurors are more solicitous of a
defendant's due process rights, and less supportive of strict crime con-
trol, than are qualified jurors.59 In six studies conducted since
58. We would emphasize that we are not making the fictional assumption that jurors
consist solely of a bundle of discrete attitudes or demographic characteristics.
Measurable attitudes and characteristics are but indirect evidence of a juror's
more complex personality, which in turn may affect her performance as a juror.
Yet, so long as the empirical challenge to death qualification rests upon this indi-
rect evidence, that evidence must be evaluated on its own terms, i.e., it must be
quantified and used in making comparisons between the types of jurors who may
serve in capital cases.
We also recognize that attitudes or characteristics do not affect behavior sin-
gularly. That is, the particular combination of these attitudes and characteristics
in a juror may be more determinative of the behaviorial effect. To date, however,
only one study has developed a composite index that quantifies the juror's cumu-
lative response to a series of attitudinal questions. See Jurow, supra note 12. As
we suggest in later discussion, see infra note 73, Jurow's reported findings do not
appear to alter the conclusions that can be drawn from an analysis of the individ-
ual attitudinal findings.
59. See, e.g., Bronson, I, II & III, supra note 17; Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, supra note 17;
Jurow, supra note 12; Harris Study, supra note 17.
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Witherspoon, researchers have discovered sizable and significant atti-
tudinal differences among excludable jurors. Several of these attitudi-
nal differences pertain to issues that are likely to arise frequently in
homicide trials. They include, for example, a juror's belief in the legal
presumption of innocence, the belief that failure to testify implies
guilt, and the belief that the insanity defense is a loophole. Other atti-
tudinal differences more generally concern the juror's disposition to-
ward judicial activism and other themes of law and justice. Examples
include a juror's belief that courts are overly technical in protecting
the constitutional rights of defendants, on the belief that defense at-
torneys are untrustworthy.
Table I sets forth some of the principal findings on attitudes dis-
closed by contemporary research. The attitudinal findings presented
are a representative sample, emphasizing those attitudes that have
been studied by several researchers. 60 One critical introductory com-
ment is offered: all the studies, with the exception of the recent work
of Fitzgerald and Ellsworth, contain serious methodological problems.
In particular, the findings for "excludable" jurors fail to omit those
jurors who would be removed from jury panels because of their inabil-
ity to adjudicate guilt impartially.61 The inclusion of these "nullifi-
ers," it is agreed, is improper given current juror qualification
standards.62 Moreover, the studies that fail to eliminate this quite sub-
60. The statements of attitudes contained in Table I, we would emphasize, are not
verbatim reproductions of the various attitudinal statements found in the several
studies. Several statements have been reduced to a simple, summary form for
ease of presentation. Compare Table I with Bronson II & HI, supra note 17, at 24;
Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, supra note 17, at 49-50. In addition, some attitudes have
been converted from negative to positive statements (and vice versa) to enable
uniform presentation. For these reasons, direct comparisons between study find-
ings are not reliable indication of the magnitude of attitudinal differences among
study populations. Table I does illustrate, however, the consistency in differences
between the excludable and non-excludable jurors regarding attitudes that ad-
dress similar concerns in the criminal justice system.
61. This flaw in the Bronson I, Jurow, and Harris studies is discussed in Fitzgerald &
Ellsworth, supra note 17, at 39. It should also be noted that the Bronson studies,
in addition to including nullifiers in the study group of excludable jurors, fail to
define the excludable group with the appropriate Witherspoon question. Bron-
son's designation of excludable jurors is based on their statement of strong oppo-
sition to capital punishment, rather than their avowed refusal to actually impose
the death penalty. Further research by Bronson indicates, however, that the two
groups may be largely interchangeable. See Bronson II & III, supra note 17, at 18
(93 percent of those strongly opposed to capital punishment would also refuse to
impose it).
62. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 n.21 (state may exclude jurors who
make clear "that their attitude toward the death penalty would prevent them
from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt").
A second methodological reservation was raised in Hovey v. Superior Court,
28 Cal. 3d 1, 616 P.2d 1301, 168 Cal. Rptr. 1280 (1980). In Hovey, the court opined
that the death-qualification studies might be biased because of their failure to
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stantial number of nullifiers from the group of excludable jurors will
likely produce an overstatement of the magnitude of attitudinal differ-
ences between excludable and includable jurors.63 For this reason, the
findings of Fitzgerald and Ellsworth are the most reliable estimate of
the magnitude of attitudinal differences. The other studies do have
value, however, in confirming the clear trend in survey findings.
Several inferences can be drawn from Table I. First, there is an
overwhelming trend among excludable jurors to show more solicitude
for the constitutional protections (e.g., the right against self-incrimina-
tion) and the possible defenses (e.g., the insanity defense) of the ac-
cused. Furthermore, the Fitzgerald and Ellsworth study reveals that
excludable and includable jurors also differ in their holding of strong
attitudes. It is reasonable to assume that such strong attitudes are
more likely to influence juror behavior, and that such attitudes will
not be as easily suppressed during deliberation.
omit those jurors who would automatically vote for the death penalty. I& at 62-
69, 616 P.2d at 1343-46, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 170-74. These jurors, it was suggested,
might have more extreme anti-defendant attitudes, and the failure to exclude
them from study groups (as they are excluded by law) might produce exaggerated
differences between truly death-qualified and non-qualified juries. Id.
Subsequent empirical research has disclosed that few jurors, in fact, vote auto-
matically for the death penalty in capital cases. See, e.g., Grisby v. Mabry, 569 F.
Supp. 1273, 1307 (E.D. Ark. 1983) (studies cited); Kadane, supra note 17. Thus,
the effect of the failure to remove automatic-death voters from study groups will
be negligible. Grisby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273, 1307-08 (E.D. Ark. 1983).
63. While there is no direct evidence that nullifiers, as such, hold the most pro-de-
fendant attitudes, Jurow's attitudinal questionnaire did reveal much higher "anti-
authoritarianism" among those with the most extreme attitudes against capital
punishment. See Jurow, supra note 12, at 586. Bronson also found greater pro-
defendant attitudes among strong capital opponents. See Bronson H & III, supra
note 57, at 17. It is reasonable to assume that nullifiers will usually be among the
strongest opponents of capital punishment, and hence will hold stronger pro-de-
fendant attitudes. See infra note 177.
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Table 1: Attitudinal Studies - 1971 to Present6 4




























* = Not statisti
% Exc's % Inc's
Study % Exc's % Inc's Total % Strongly Strongly Total %
(Year) Agreeing Agreeing Difference Agreeing Agreeing Difference
Fitzgerald 24% 32% 9% 11% 16% 5%
(1984)
Bronson I 21% 26% 5%
(1971)
Bronson HE 17% 51% 34%
(1980)
Bronson 1II 38% 41% 3%*
(1980)
Harris 28% 34% 6%
(1971)
Fitzgerald 59% 78% 19% 28% 52% 24%
Bronson I 61% 83% 22%
Bronson II 48% 77% 29%
Bronson I 26% 67% 41%
Harris 57% 67% 10%
Fitzgerald 20% 41% 21% 6% 23% 17%
Bronson I 52% 82% 30%
Bronson HE 19% 71% 52%
Bronson 1I 19% 61% 42%
Harris 45% 56% 10%
Fitzgerald 74% 68% 6%* 56% 50% 6%
Harris 95% 94% 1%'o
Fitzgerald 65% 74% 9% 21% 39% 18%
Harris 72% 83% 11%
Fitzgerald 64% ' 57% 7%* 50% 38% 12%*
Fitzgerald 46% 57% 11% 22% 38% 16%
cally significant at p < .05
Table I reveals wide variation in the magnitude of attitudinal dif-
ferences reported. The more reliable findings of Fitzgerald and Ells-
worth, for example, show attitudinal differences ranging from 6 to 24
64. The studies presented in Table I consist, in order of presentation, of Fitzgerald &
Ellsworth, supra note 17, at 43; Bronson I, supra note 57, at 8; Bronson II & III,
supra note 57, at 19, 26 (two separate studies published in the same article); and
Harris Study, supra note 17, at 18, 20, 26, 30, 31 (excludable jurors defined as
those who "could never vote for the death penalty").
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percent. 65 The question arises, therefore, do these differences consti-
tute excludable jurors as a "distinctive" group in the community
under the fair-cross-section doctrine? Although there is no guiding
precedent in answering this question, the better answer would seem to
be "yes." The reported attitudes are highly relevant to criminal adju-
dication, the attitudinal differences are quite large, and the pattern of
differences is uniformly consistent.66 At a minimum, the findings
should justify further inquiry under the Duren standard to determine
whether the process of death qualification ultimately produces capital
juries with attitudes substantially different from those of the commu-
nity at large.
The ultimate impact of death qualification on jury attitudes will
result from the interaction of two factors: absolute attitudinal differ-
ences, and the proportion of excludable jurors in the community. This
phenomenon can be demonstrated by a simple hypothetical. Assume
that a community excludes lawyers from jury service. Assume that
lawyers constitute 1 percent of the community. Assume, finally, that
100 percent of all lawyers believe in the presumption of innocence,
while only 50 percent of the remainder of the community so believes.
In a jury of pool of 1000 persons, from which lawyers are excluded, 500
jurors (50 percent) will believe in the presumption of innocence. If
lawyers were not excluded, then 505 jurors in the pool6 7 (50.5 per-
cent), would believe in the presumption of innocence. Thus, jurors
remaining after lawyer exclusion would still seem to "fairly and rea-
sonably" represent the attitude presuming innocence. Lawyers, there-
fore, could be constitutionally excluded unless lawyers, as such, were
protected from exclusion under some other provision of law.
Although prior research has continually failed to quantify the ulti-
mate effect of death qualification on jury attitudes, that effect can be
proximately estimated by assuming likely proportions of excludable
jurors in the population. The proportion of excludable jurors, after
eliminating from the population all "nullifiers," will probably range
from 5 to 20 percent (based on past survey findings).6s Adopting the
65. The actual magnitude of differences reported in Fitzgerald & Ellsworth will vary
upward or downward from the reported differences. However, since Fitzgerald
and Ellsworth fail to report this "margin of error," or other data from which it
can be calculated, we shall use the mean numbers reported by them. See W. MEN-
DENHALL, INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS 258-68 (1983).
66. The attitudinal evidence has been thought sufficient to constitute excludable ju-
rors a distinctive group by those courts that have applied the fair-cross-section
analysis. See, e.g., Keeten v. Garrison, 578 F. Supp. 1164, 1181 (W.D.N.C. 1984),
rev'd, 742 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1984); Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 P. Supp. 1273,1283 (E.D.
Ark. 1983), affd, 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985).
67. This assumes that the pool remains constant at 1000.
68. It is difficult to be precise in calculating the exact number of excludables in the
population, since many studies fail to eliminate nullifiers and fail to report find-
ings from which one could estimate the number of nullifiers. In addition, the
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more reliable attitudinal findings of Fitzerald and Ellsworth, one can
estimate the ultimate impact of death qualification in communities
with these various proportions of excludable jurors. This range of ef-
fects is set forth in Table II.
As the computations in Table II reveal, there is a relatively small
difference in the attitudinal composition of the jury pool before and
after death qualification. Assuming the largest specific proportion of
excludable jurors yet disclosed by survey research-17 percent-the
attitudinal differences in the eligible jury populations vary from 1 per-
cent to 3.7 percent. And, assuming the proportion of excludable jurors
reported in the case of Grigsby v. Mabry (11 percent), the greatest atti-
tudinal difference is approximately 2 percent.
percentage of excludables will inevitably vary, depending on the number of oppo-
nents of capital punishment, and the number of blacks (and to a less extent, wo-
men) in the relevant population. See infra text accompanying notes 80-81.
Estimates of the percentage of excludables include: 17 percent, see Fitzgerald &
Ellsworth, supra note 17, at 43 (based on research in Alameda County, Califor-
nia); 11 percent, see Precision Research Survey, supra note 17, at 19, (based on
research in Arkansas), cited in Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273, 1285 (E.D.
Ark. 1985); and approximately 5 percent, see Winick, supra note 43, at 28 (based
on research in one Florida judicial circuit) (adjustment made for estimated nulli-
fiers). In addition, a rough estimate of the national percentage of excludable ju-
rors in 1974 can be made drawn from the Harris Study, supra note 17. The Harris
survey found that 31 percent of all respondents could never vote for the death
penalty, id, at 5, and that more than half of these (56 percent) would be unable to
adjudicate a defendant guilty even knowing that the defendant could be subse-
quently sentenced to death only by a unanimous jury vote. Id. at 34. Thus, one
can roughly estimate that 15 percent of the surveyed population would be exclud-
able jurors after screening for nullifiers. Of course, figures based on a 1971 popu-
lation will exaggerate current opposition to the death penalty, since that
opposition has declined substantially during the intervening years. See BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 262-64. Suffice it
to say that we have adopted a range of population values that seems reasonably
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The attitudinal impact of death qualification can be further under-
stood by examining the probability of an attitude's appearing on a par-
ticular twelve-person jury.70 Assuming that community attitudes
appear in particular jury through randomized distribution,71 one can
estimate the probability of an attitude's appearance both before and
after death qualification. By way of example, there will be 3.8 percent
more jurors strongly disfavoring the insanity defense when the 20 per-
cent excludable jurors in a population have been removedJ 2 When
juries are death-qualified in such a population, the probability of ran-
domly drawing at least one juror who strongly disfavors the insanity
defense is .999 (virtually certain); the probability of drawing three or
more such jurors is .985; and the probability of drawing six or more
such jurors is .652. If juries in the same population were not death
qualified, by comparison, the corresponding probabilities would be
.999 (again virtually certain), .965, and .510. Thus, in this hypothetical
population, death qualification has little effect except insofar as it oc-
casionally adds an additional juror attitude to a jury on which that
attitude is already well represented. And this effect, we might add,
occurs because we have assumed both a substantial attitudinal differ-
ence (24 percent) between excludable and includable jurors, together
with a substantial population (20 percent) of excludable jurors. Less
extreme assumptions are probably appropriate in most instances.
Therefore, if the fair-cross-section doctrine is invoked to challenge
the effects of death qualification on the representation of community
attitudes, it appears that these attitudes are "fairly and reasonably"
represented notwithstanding the process of death qualification.7 3 Fair
70. The methodology used in computing the stated probabilities is set forth in the
Appendix, infra. For similar use of probability theory in assessing the constitu-
tionality of changes in the size of juries, see Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 236
(1978). See also Lempert, Uncovering Nondiscernible Differences: Empirical Re-
search and the Jury-Size Cases, 73 MIcH. L. REV. 643, 668-79 (1975).
71. The selection of jurors, of course, will not be purely random. The process of voir
dire and peremptory challenge, in particular, will assert a strong, non-random
influence on juror characteristics. See infra text accompanying notes 136-55.
Nonetheless, the challenge to death qualification is directed at insuring the most
randomly representative jury pool at least prior to the further screening
processes that may occur at trial.
72. The probability calculations presented in the text are based on the largest attitu-
dinal difference pertaining to specific criminal defense concerns reported in Fitz-
gerald & Ellsworth. See supra Table I. Thus, the calculations illustrate the
greatest effect that death qualification might have, assuming the reliability of the
findings reported in Fitzgerald and Ellsworth.
73. We would emphasize that extant research on attitudinal differences-upon which
our analysis is based-focuses too much on particular attitudes and iot enough
on particular attitudinal makeups of jurors. The importance of attitudes at trial
may result from the presence of a juror with a strong attitudinal disposition that,
in its totality, renders the juror less conviction prone. The only research that
attempts to measure the total attitudinal makeup of jurors is that of Jurow, supra
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and reasonable representation, concededly, is a normative standard
and not an empirical determination; the courts could deem the attitu-
dinal differences reported sufficient to invoke constitutional protec-
tion. Yet, two factors suggest that a fair-cross-section violation will
not be found in the given circumstances. First, in related challenges to
the composition of juries, discussed more fully in the next section,74
the courts have not been willing to invalidate procedures that produce
effects on the magnitude of 1 to 3 percent. Second, use of the fair-
cross-section doctrine in the present circumstances is premised on the
unproven assumption that attitudes affect jury behavior and thus im-
plicate sixth amendment concerns.75 Given the modest attitudinal dif-
ferences produced by death qualification, it is doubtful that the
process would be invalidated where the underlying assumption is
somewhat speculative.
C. The Representation of Minorities and Women
on Death-Qualified Juries
The fair-cross-section requirement of the sixth amendment
originated in decisions addressing the racial and gender composition of
juries. 7 6 Racial and gender disparities have constantly drawn the close
scrutiny of the Court, which has been willing to assume that such dis-
parities can affect the performance of the jury.77 Because race and
gender have been historical bases for governmental discrimination,
the Court has viewed race and gender disparities in jury service as
evils independent of any particular effect on the jury's function.
Survey data has long confirmed that blacks and women are less
note 12. Jurow's research, using a composite index of several attitudes, seeks to
measure the "authoritarianism" and "anti-authoritarianism" of excludable and
non-excludable jurors. Id at 580, 603-04.
Jurow reports that, on a scale of 10 to 30, excludable jurors had a mean "au-
thoritarian" scope of 18.7, compared to a mean for all other jurors of 22.4
(weighted). Excludable jurors had a mean "anti-authoritarian" score of 16.8,
compared to a mean for all other jurors of 15.1 (weighted). Whether such differ-
ences are functionally important is impossible to say; their magnitude does not
seem great, however, on a scale of 10 to 30.
More importantly, Jurow's research fails to exclude nullifiers, who presuma-
bly hold some of the more extreme attitudes of the study group. Given the small
number of excludable jurors-18 of 187-and the likelihood that many of these
were also nullifiers, see supra note 68, Jurow's findings probably overstate appre-
ciably the attitudinal effects of death qualification. This probability is supported
by Jurow's finding that juror groups with less extreme views on capital punish-
ment-the large majority of Jurow's sample-show relatively minor differences
in attitudinal means. Jurow, supra note 12, at 585-88.
74. See infra text accompanying notes 82-95.
75. See infra text accompanying notes 104-05.
76. See Ziegler, supra note 51, at 1049-57.
77. Id. at 1055. See also supra text accompanying notes 33.
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supportive of capital punishment and criminal sanction.7 8 From this
finding one could reasonably infer that blacks and women would, if
considered for jury duty in an actual capital case, be less willing to
vote for death penalty and hence would be disproportionately ex-
cluded through death qualification. Provided the magnitude of this
exclusion was substantial, death qualification would be challenged
under the sixth amendment on grounds more precedented, and more
favored, then that of attitudinal disparity.
Several contemporary surveys have addressed the impact of death
qualification on the race and gender of jurors. The surveys, summa-
rized in Table Ill, confirm that the impact of death qualification falls
more heavily on blacks and women. As with studies on attitudes, how-
ever, the surveys on race and gender often contain a methodological
flaw: most of the surveys fail to eliminate from the population of ex-
cludable jurors those jurors who fail to qualify for jury service because
they could not determine guilt or innocence impartially. If survey
findings were adjusted to eliminate these "nullifiers" from the jury
population, the impact of death qualification would be reduced appre-
ciably.7 9 Thus, the findings of Fitzgerald and Ellsworth are, again, the
most reliable findings on the magnitude of the impact of death
qualification.
Table III-A: Survey Findings on the Demographic
Effects of Death Qualification8 0
Demographic % of % of Difference in
Group (% of Group Others Rates of
Study (Year) Sample) Excluded Excluded Exclusion
Fitzgerald (1984) Blacks (13.2%) 25.5% 16.5% 9%
Women (51.2%) 21% 13% 8%
Precision Research Blacks (12.4%) 45% 11% 34%
Survey (1981) Women (51%) 21% 10% 11%
Bronson I (1971) Blacks- (5.5%) 29% 9% 20%
Hispanics
Women (45.7%) 13% 8% 5%
Bronson II (1980) Blacks (9.2%) 22% 8% 14%
Harris Survey (1971) Blacks (14%) 46% 29% 17%
Women (50%) 37% 24% 13%
78. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTIcs, U.S. DEP'T OF JUsTICE, supra note 5, at 262-64.
79. By way of illustration, the Precision Research Survey, supra note 17, reveals that
36 percent of blacks were nullifiers, compared to 9 percent of whites; and 13 per-
cent of females were nullifiers, compared to 10 percent of males. I& Further-
more, this survey revealed considerable overlap in the categories of excludables
and nullifiers. Id. at 19.
80. The studies included in Table I-A are, in order of presentation, Fitzgerald &
Elsworth, supra note 17, at 47; Precision Research Survey, supra note 17, at 19;
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Table III-B: Measurements of the Demographic
Impact of Death Qualification 1
Demographic Group
in Death-Qualified Absolute
(DQ)/Non-Qualified Absolute Impact: 12 Comparative
Study (Year) (NQ) Juries Disparity Person Jury Disparity
Fitzgerald (1984) Blacks: DQ-12% 1.2% .14 juror 9%
NQ-13.2%
Women: DQ-46.8% 2.4% .28 juror 4.6%
NQ-51.2%
Precision Blacks: DQ- 8.4% 4.4% .53 juror 35%
Research NQ-12.8%
Survey (1981)
Women: DQ-47.9% 3.1% .37 juror 6.1%
NQ-51%
Bronson I (1971) Blacks: DQ-4.4% 1.1% .14 juror 21%
Hispanics: NQ-5.5%
Women: DQ-44.3% 1.4% .16 juror 4.4%
NQ-45.7%
Bronson III (1980) Blacks: DQ-7.8% 1.4% .17 juror 15%
NQ-9.2%
Harris Survey Blacks: DQ-12.2% 1.8% .22 juror 12.7%
(1971) NQ-14%
Women: DQ-46.2% 3.8% .45 juror 7.5%
NQ-50%
Table III-A reveals that women and blacks are, in fact, excludable
at higher rates through death qualification than are men and whites.
It thus becomes important to determine whether the magnitude of the
difference in exclusion rates is sufficient to establish a violation of the
fair-cross-section doctrine. Case precedent provides considerable gui-
dance in interpreting the evidence on the demographic composition of
death-qualified juries. Three methods of interpretation, summarized
in Table III-B, have been referred to by the courts in adjudicating
demographic challenges to jury composition under the sixth amend-
ment and the equal protection clause.82 The "absolute disparity" mea-
Bronson I, supra note 17, at 18 n.69, 22 n.80; Bronson II & III, supra note 17, at 28;
Harris Study, supra note 17, at 5. For additional comments on the methodology
of Bronson's work, see supra note 61.
81. The studies included in Table III-B are, in order of presentation, Fitzgerald &
Ellsworth, supra note 17, at 47; Precision Research Survey, supra note 17, at 19;
Bronson I, supra note 17, at 18, 22; Bronson II & III, supra note 17, at 28; Harris
Study, supra note 17, at 5.
82. See Beale, supra note 38, at 273-77. A fourth measure of disparity is based on
"standard deviation analysis," which indicates the likelihood that jury variations
axe attributable to random fluctuation. Id- at 276. This measure is of little value
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sure (column 2 in Table III-B) consists of the difference in the
percentage of group members in a jury population before and after a
challenged process is used.83 The findings of Fitzgerald and Ells-
worth, for example, reveal that blacks constituted 13.2 percent of the
jury population before death qualification, and 12 percent of the jury
population after death qualification, producing an absolute disparity of
1.2 percent in the jury population.84
Related to the absolute disparity standard is the "absolute impact"
standard (column 3 in Table III-B). This measure takes the finding of
absolute disparity and then multiplies that figure by the number of
jurors on a particular panel8 5 (always twelve in the case of capital ju-
ries). The absolute impact of death qualification on blacks, again
based on the findings of Fitzgerald and Ellsworth, is a reduction of .14
black juror per average twelve-person jury.
A final standard for assessing the magnitude of disparities in jury
service is "comparative disparity" measure (column 4 in Table III-B).
This measure responds in part to a limitation of the absolute disparity
and absolute impact measures. 86 The absolute measures, while ex-
pressing the impact of the selection practice on the general jury popu-
lation, fail to capture the relative consequences of that practice for a
protected group. For example, a minority group constituting 10 per-
cent of the potential jury population will suffer an absolute disparity
of only 5 percent when its representation is reduced to 5 percent of the
actual jury population. Yet, to the extent that the affected group is as
much a concern as the affected jury population, the absolute disparity
standard fails to report an important consequence: that the protected
group has suffered a 50 percent relative reduction in its representation
on jury panels. Thus, the comparitive disparity measure adjusts for
this limitation through dividing the absolute disparity by the percent-
age of protected group members in the population. To illustrate, Fitz-
gerald and Ellsworth report that blacks suffer an absolute disparity of
1.2 percent because of death qualification, while they suffer a compar-
ative disparity of 9 percent.
None of these measures, we should emphasize, has been consist-
in the present context, since the more important question is that of the relative
magnitude of the demographic effects of death qualification. It should be noted,
however, that the findings elaborated on in Tables III-A and IIH-B are all statisti-
cally significant at p. = .05, thus largely ruling out the possibility that they are
attributable to chance occurrence. See Pa HASTIE, S. PENROD & N. PENNmGTON,
supra note 49, at 244.
83. Beale, supra note 38, at 273-74.
84. See infra Appendix.
85. Beale, supra note 38, at 275-76.
86. Id- at 274-75.
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ently used by the lower courts.8 7 Nor has the Supreme Court adopted
any particular measure or combination of measures in assessing jury
disparities.88 Application of each of these measures to the evidence on
death qualification, however, does provide several benchmarks against
which the evidence can be assessed.
Table III-B reveals absolute disparities in the jury service of blacks
ranging from 1.2 percent to 4.4 percent, and absolute disparities in the
jury service of women ranging from 1.4 percent to 3.8 percent. Even
accepting the larger estimates-which probably overstate the actual
figures considerably-this degree of disparity falls far short of the
benchmark established by precedent. To date, no case has found an
absolute disparity of 10 percent legally significant, and challenges
based on disparities as large as 12 percent have been rejected on occa-
sion.8 9 By comparison, absolute disparities greater than 20 percent
have consistently sustained challenges to jury selection procedures.9 0
Table III-B reveals comparative disparities in the jury service of
blacks ranging from 9 percent to 35 percent, and comparative dispari-
ties in the jury service of women ranging from 3 percent to 7.5 percent.
Obviously, the prevalence of women in the general population sub-
stantially reduces the threat that women will, as a group be greatly
87. Id. at 273. See generally J. VANDYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 58-62, 95-98
(1977).
88. See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625,630 (1972) (no particular mathetmatical
standards apply in assessing exclusionary practices; all possible explanatory fac-
tors must be considered).
89. See, e.g., United States v. Gometz, 730 F.2d 475, 478 (7th Cir. 1984) (absolute dis-
parity of .57 percent insufficient); United States v. Tuttle, 729 F.2d 1325, 1327-28
n.4 (11th Cir. 1984) (absolute disparities of 6.3 percent or 9.1 percent not suffi-
cient; minimum of 10 percent required); United States v. Hafen, 726 F.2d 21, 23
(1st Cir. 1984) (absolute disparity of 2.02 percent insufficient); United States v.
Hawkins, 661 F.2d 436, 442 (5th Cir. 1981) (absolute disparities of 1.75 percent and
2.45 percent insufficient), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 999 (1982); United States v. Duran
De Amesquita, 582 F. Supp. 1326, 1330 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (absolute disparity of 6.7
percent insufficient); United States v. Musto, 540 F. Supp. 346, 356-57 (D.N.J.
1982) (absolute disparities of 4.2 percent, 5.4 percent and 7.5 percent insufficient),
affd sub noin United States v. Aimont, 715 F.2d 822 (3d Cir. 1982). See also
Beale, supra note 38, at 278 n.60 (further cases cited).
90. See, e.g., LaRoche v. Perrin, 718 F.2d 500, 502 (1st Cir. 1983) (absolute disparity of
26.2 percent sufficient); Birh v. Montgomery, 709 F.2d 690, 699-700 (11th Cir. 1983)
(absolute disparities of 32.9 percent and 17.6 percent sufficient), on rehg, 725 F.2d
587 (11th Cir.), reh'g denied, 729 F.2d 1468 (11th Cir. 1984). See also Beale, supra
note 38:
Although disparities between 10% and 15% have been found significant
in a few cases, several courts have held disparities in this range insuffi-
cient to establish a prima facie case of either an equal protection or a fair
cross section violation. Absolute disparities between 15% and 20% have
generally been deemed significant, and disparities of more than 20%





underrepresented in the eligible jury population. The same is not
true, however, for minorities, whose numbers in the general jury pop-
ulation will often be small.
Cases in which the comparative disparity standard has been used
are limited in number, as relatively few courts have employed this
standard. A comparative disparity of 38 percent has sustained a legal
challenge, at least when accompanied by a large absolute disparity
(14.4 percent).91 At the same time, comparative disparities of 33 per-
cent and 59 percent have been found insufficient, at least when accom-
panied by small absolute disparities (3.43 percent and 1.54 percent,
respectively). 92 Based merely on prior case law, then, the comparative
disparities produced in death qualification constitute weak proof of a
constitutional violation respecting black jurors, and no proof at all of a
violation respecting women.93
No court has yet invalidated the process of death qualification be-
cause of its impact on the demographic representativeness of resulting
juries.94 In fact, the demographic impact seems most often to have
been urged as secondary support for the larger challenge to death
qualification. The evidence set forth above, as interpreted through the
evolving judicial standards for statistical proof, suggests that death
qualification does not sufficiently diminish the demographic represen-
tativeness of juries to sustain, alone, a fair-cross-section argument.
This is not to say, of course, that the demographic effect is numerically
inconsequential for constitutional concerns. The statistical require-
ments for jury challenges are still in an evolutionary period, and con-
stitutional standards could be redefined to give new legal significance
91. Barrow v. State, 239 Ga. 162, 165, 236 S.E.2d 257, 260 (1977). See also LaRoche v.
Perrin, 718 F.2d 500, 502 (1st Cir. 1983) (comparative disparity of 70 percent suffi-
cient when accompanied by absolute disparity of 26.2 percent).
92. United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 557, 589 (10th Cir. 1976). See also United States v.
Hafen, 726 F.2d 21, 23 (1st Cir.) (comparative disparity of 54.2 percent but abso-
lute disparity of only 2.02 percent), cer denied, 104 S. Ct. 2179 (1984); United
States v. Musto, 540 F. Supp. 346, 356-57 (D.N.J. 1982) (comparative disparity of
79.2 percent but absolute disparity of only 4.2 percent), affd sub. nan. United
States v. Aimont, 715 F.2d 822 (3d Cir. 1982); Beale, supra note 38, at 280.
93. The same result is suggested under the absolute impact standard. The absolute
impact of death qualification ranges from .14 juror to .53 juror. See supra Table
III-B. No court has yet invalidated a jury selection process when the absolute
impact is less than one juror per twelve-person jury. See, e.g., United States v.
Tuttle, 729 F.2d 1325, 1327, 1329 (11th Cir. 1984). See also Beale, supra note 38, at
280 ("The courts that have applied the impact standard have generally concluded
that the challenger failed to prove a sufficient disparity when proportionate mi-
nority representation would have added only one or two additional minority ju-
rors to a typical grand or petit jury.")
94. A number of courts have, however, supplemented their analysis by reference to
the demographic effects of death qualification. See, e.g., Grigsby v. Mabry, 758
F.2d 226, 231 n.9 (8th Cir. 1985); Keeten v. Garrison, 578 F. Supp. 1164, 1182
(W.D.N.C. 1984), rev'd, 742 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1984).
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to the numbers.9 5 But such redefinition of standards would appear to
be needed if the fair-cross-section challenge to death qualification is to
succeed.
D. The Cumulative Effects of Death Qualification on the
Representativeness of Juries
In the preceding analysis we have examined several quantitative
arguments concerning discrete effects of death qualification. Contrary
to the conclusion of many commentators, we have suggested that
death qualification fails to produce any particular effect that alone is
clearly violative of the fair-cross-section doctrine. Yet, while it is ana-
lytically helpful to isolate the various components of the Witherspoon
challenge, such isolation is not compelled when evaluating the legal
effect of the various findings. That is, while no attitudinal or demo-
graphic effect alone states a cause of action, cumulatively these effects
could not be deemed significant.
The Court's decision in Ballew v. Georgia,96 which found five-per-
son criminal juries violative of the sixth amendment, provides signifi-
cant precedent for interpreting the cumulative effects of death
qualification. In Ballew, the Court identified several effects that a re-
duction in jury size might produce, including a dilution in the attitudi-
nal and demographic representativeness of juries, and an increase in
their tendency to convict.97 While finding no constitutional infirmity
in any particular effect, the Court struck down the use of five-person
juries in light of the totality of its effects.98
A clear analogy can be drawn between Ballew and the problem of
death qualification.99 What is unclear is whether Ballew's rationale
has vitality outside the context of a challenge to jury size. Both con-
curring justices in Ballew,lOO and subsequent lower court judges,101
have viewed Ballew as an instance of line-drawing: at some point the
reduction in jury size had to cease, and that point was at five jurors.
Under this view, the Ballew discussion of the empirical evidence is
95. For critical commentary on the emerging statistical standards, see D. BALDUs &
J. CoLE, supra note 29, at 78-90. Further guidance might be forthcoming in the
1985-86 Supreme Court term, if the Court grants review of Davis v. Zant, 721 F.2d
1478 (11th Cir. 1983), affld sub nom Davis v. Kemp, 752 F.2d 1515 (11th Cir. 1984).
That case poses the question whether absolute disparities of 18.4 percent and 18.1
percent in the jury service of women and blacks, respectively, are sufficient to
shift to the state the burden of justifying selection procedures.
96. 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
97. Id at 234-37.
98. Id- at 239, 242.
99. For a detailed comparison of the Ballew rationale and the empirical challenge to
death qualification, see White, supra note 10, at 377-96.
100. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 245-46 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring).
101. See, e.g., Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573, 583 (5th Cir. 1981).
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supportive dicta, but in no way establishes a new empirical standard
for evaluating sixth amendment claims. Further justification for this
view is found in the fact that Ballew validated six-person juries, even
though the quantitive evidence against them was no less compelling
than that against five-person juries. 0 2
One can only speculate whether the Court will eventually extend
the Ballew rationale to other contexts, and such speculation is made
especially difficult given the current Court's incontinence in adhering
to precedent.103 Thus, the historical Witherspoon question-whether
death-qualified juries are actually conviction prone-looms in impor-
tance. For not only does the empirical proof of conviction proneness
have independent legal significance under Witherspoon, it could sug-
gest further importance for the exigous evidence of a fair-cross-section
violation. Proof of conviction proneness may demonstrate that the ef-
fects of death qualification on jury representation are not simply spec-
ulative; and such proof may suggest that the cumulative effects of
death qualification implicate concerns similar to those prompting the
Court's action in Baloew.
III. THE CONVICTION PRONENESS OF
DEATH-QUALIFIED JURIES
The hypothesis that juror attitudes and characteristics are reliable
predictors of jury behavior has not fared well in the years since
Witherspoon. Numerous attempts to model jury behavior, and to de-
velop a science of jury selection, have produced few, if any, strong cor-
relations between pre-existing juror traits and actual voting
behavior. 0 4 As a result, the behavioral paradigm that underlies much
of the research on the conviction proneness of death-qualified juries
has been questioned.105
It is important, however, to distinguish between the general failure
of empirical research to create reliable, explanatory models of jury
behavior, and the specific effort of death-qualification research to es-
tablish some process influence on jury verdicts. For one thing, genera-
lized research findings from non-capital adjudication are not directly
transferable to capital cases, where the trial procedures and environ-
102. W. LOH, supra note 26, at 442; White, supra note 10, at 383.
103. See, ag., Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844 (1985) (overturning the Witherspoon
standard for juror exclusion); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 104
S. Ct. 900 (1984) (overturning restrictions on state sovereign immunity under the
eleventh amendment).
104. See generally W. LOH, supra note 26, at 401-03; R HAsTiE, S. PENROD & N. PEN-
NINGTON, supra note 49, at 126-27, 149-50, 237-38; M. SAKS & R. HASTIE, SocLAL
PsYCHOLOGY IN COURT 70 (1978).
105. See, e.g., Keeten v. Garrison, 742 F.2d 129, 132, 133 n.7 (4th Cir. 1984); Grigsby v.
Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 249-50 (8th Cir. 1985) (Gibson, J., dissenting).
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ment differ markedly. 106 Research on death qualification is a far more
refined inquiry, addressing a carefully delimited study group and case
type. It is entirely plausible that strong opponents of capital punish-
ment will tend to adjudicate capital cases differently, even though
Democrats and Republicans, for example, show no measurable voting
differences in conventional adjudication.
Furthermore, the perceived failure of generalized jury research re-
sults largely from concerns not germane to the study of death qualifi-
cation. Generalized research has failed in its effort to detect strong
and consistent correlations between juror characteristics and juror be-
havior, and in its effort to supply comprehensive predictive models.107
The research on conviction proneness, by comparison, attempts
neither to model capital case outcomes nor to make predictions in spe-
cific cases. Such research attempts to establish that death qualifica-
tion will, from time to time, in cases that may not be identifiable, yield
convictions that would not result were death qualification elimi-
nated.-0s And of greater importance, what might be a "weak" finding
for general jury research-for example, that only 10 percent of the
variation in verdicts can be correlated with jury traits' 0 9-might have
considerable legal significance in the context of death qualification.
Evidence that 10 percent of the variation in capital convictions results
from death qualification may constitute compelling proof that the pro-
cess undermines the right to trial by an impartial jury, even if capital
verdicts remain otherwise unpredictable. Thus, it is vital to identify
the specific empirical and legal issues addressed by the research on
death qualification.
A. The Evidence on Conviction Proneness
As indicated earlier, direct proof of the phenomenon of conviction
proneness poses several methodological problems. Because of contem-
porary legal restrictions on access to trial juries, observation of an in-
quiry into the actual decisional process is practically impossible.11o
Researchers must rely, instead, on simulations or artificial summaries
of the trial process. Yet these attempted proximations of actual trials
106. That the death-qualification studies may constitute an exception to the general
jury research findings is recognized in R. HASTIE, S. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON,
supra note 49, at 127.
107. See W. LOH, supra note 26, at 402; R. HAsTiE, S. PE ROD & N. PENNINGTON, supM
note 49, at 126-33.
108. For this reason, the evidence on death qualification will not be adequate to prove
that a specific conviction is a product of the process. Thus, if the courts were to
require situational proof of prejudice, no challenge to death qualification would
likely succeed. See infra text accompanying notes 166-67.
109. W. LoH, supra note 26, at 402.
110. See, e.g., Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 237 (8th Cir. 1985); D. VINSON & P.
ANTiHoNy, supa note 28, at 49.
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inevitably invite the criticism that they are unrealistic and hence un-
reliable."'1 Among the major inadequacies of simulation research are
the following: (1) individuals who volunteer to participate in simula-
tions will differ from actual jurors, who are compelled to serve and
who are screened through voir dire;" 2 (2) the representation of evi-
dence through simulated video tapes or written case summaries dimin-
ishes the actual impact of evidence, thus giving exaggerated
importance to juror attitudes and traits;"31 and (3) the voting of jurors
in mock cases is not attended with the gravity and responsibility that
are present when the accused's life is really at stake, again giving ex-
aggerated importance to juror traits.
All of these criticisms are valid and pose legitimate threats to the
reliability of research not based on actual trial investigation. As a
matter of policy, however, the imperfections of extant research should
not preclude its use in the challenge to death qualification. The state
can hardly insulate its jury process from study and then repudiate re-
search for its lack of authenticity. Principles of fair play suggest that
the burden of proof should be lessened when the defendant has special
possession of determinative information. 1 4 At a minimum, simulated
research findings should be accorded presumptive validity when the
state presents no countervailing evidence, and when the simulated re-
search conforms to contemporary standards of empirical inquiry."15
At present, there are five reported studies attempting to measure
the conviction proneness of death-qualified jurors, and the principal
findings of these studies are set out in Table IV.116 Only one of the
studies, that of Cowan, Ellsworth, and Thompson (hereinafter,
Cowan) is a highly reliable measure of conviction proneness. Several
111. See, e.g., Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 237 (8th Cir. 1985); Hovey v. Superior
Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 61-62, 616 P.2d 1301, 1342, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 169 (1980).
112. See, e.g., Cowan, supra note 12, at 61-62 (study participants consisting of individu-
als responding to newspaper advertisements; payment of $10 for participation);
Jurow, supra note 12, at 577 (paid employees of Sperry Rand Corporation).
113. See, e.g., Bernard & Dwyer, supra note 17, at 110 (written case description);
Cowan, supra note 12, at 53 (two and one-half hour simulated videotape); Jurow,
supra note 12, at 582 (tape recorded case description); Harris Study, supra note
17, at 41 (written case description).
114. Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12 STAN. L.
REV. 5, 12 (1959) (when evidence lies within the control of one party, that party
should bear the burden of proof on matters relating to such evidence). See also
Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 237 (8th Cir. 1985) ("[1It is the courts who have
often stood in the way of surveys involving real jurors and we should not now
reject a study because of this deficiency.")
115. Significantly, the states involved in death-qualification challenges have yet to
summon specific empirical evidence that rebuts the challengers' evidence.
116. The studies reported in Table IV are, in order of presentation, Cowen, supra note
12, at 68; Jurow, supra note 12, at 583; Bernard & Dwyer, supra note 17, at 112;
Harris Study, supra note 17, at 35 (based on the single homicide case used by
Harris).
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aspects of the other studies undermine their usefulness. All four fail
to remove "nullifiers" from the group of excludable jurors, and none
of the four uses video tapes or similar devices to provide a more realis-
tic presentation of the simulated cases.11 7 Therefore, the work of
Cowan provides the best evidence of the phenomenon of conviction
proneness, even though the other studies confirm the direction of the
findings.
117. See supra note 113.
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The findings summarized in Table IV reveal differences in the ab-
solute acquittal rates of excludable jurors that are sizable and consis-
tent. Even though some of the findings are not statistically
significant,1' 9 they are part of a uniform pattern in which death-quali-
fied jurors, as a group, vote to convict more often than excludable ju-
rors. Particularly suggestive are the more reliable findings of Cowan
that reveal the largest reported difference (24.7 percent) int he acquit-
tal rates of the two types of jurors.
In considering the conviction proneness of death-qualified juries,
courts have often given primary emphasis to these absolute differ-
ences in acquittal rates.120 This emphasis, however, leads to a misun-
derstanding of the data's importance. Three further considerations
should be taken into account in determining the legal impact of the
findings. First, the difference in acquittal rates should be adjusted to
reflect the proportion of excludable jurors in the jury population. The
pertinent comparison is between death-qualified and nonqualified ju-
ries-which is a function of population proportions--and not between
excludable and includable jurors. Second, the probability of selecting
one (or more) acquittal jurors in a twelve-person jury should be con-
sidered. The pertinent inquiry is how death qualification affects the
voting pattern of particular juries, given the legal requirement of a
unanimous vote for conviction. Third, one should consider the type
and frequency of cases in which the phenomenon of conviction prone-
ness will occur. The findings on conviction proneness are reliable only
insofar as the experimental research case is one that will be duplicated
in the criminal justice system; the representativeness of research case,
then, must be examined.
Table IV illustrates the effect that the proportion of excludable ju-
rors has on absolute acquittal rates. As evidenced by the findings of
Cowan, the difference in absolute acquittal rates varies between 2.6
and 4.9 percent, depending on whether excludable jurors constitute 10
percent or 20 percent, respectively, of the eligible juror population.
But even these findings fail to capture the true effect of death qualifi-
cation on particular jury verdicts. Capital verdicts are obviously not
based on mass public opinion polls, but on the unanimous vote (in the
119. See, e.g., Bernard & Dwyer, supra note 57, at 112; Jurow, supra note 12, at 583.
120. See, e.g., Keeten v. Garrison, 578 F. Supp. 1164,1172-75 (W.D.N.C. 1984), rev'd, 742
F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1984); Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273,1297-1301 (E.D. Ark.
1983), affd, 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985); Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 27-
42, 616 P.2d 1301, 1315-26, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 142-53 (1980). In Grigsby, the state
properly argued that simple comparisons in the acquittl rates of excludable and
includable jurors are misleading. Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 236 (1985). The
court casually dismissed this contention by noting that "reasonable conclusions
about the differences between [death-qualified and non-qualified] juries can be




instance of conviction) of a twelve-person jury. If one assumes that
excludable jurors appear in juror pools on a random basis, then the
general effect of death qualification can be proximated by determining
the reduced likelihood of obtaining an "acquittal" juror on a twelve-
person jury after death qualification.' 2 1
Tables V and VI set forth the probabilities of obtaining one or more
acquittal jurors both before and after death qualification. Table V is
based on the voting patterns reported in the work of Cowan, and rep-
resents the effect of death qualification assuming either a 10 percent
or 20 percent proportion of excludable jurors in the eligible juror pop-
ulation. Table VI is based on the voting patterns in the work of Ju-
row, and is included to illustrate an important aspect of case research
on the phenomenon of conviction proneness.
Table V: Probability of Obtaining Acquittal Juror(s)
on Death-Qualified and Non-Qualified Juries (Cowan)12 2
Probability of X Acquittal Probability of X Acquittal
Jurors Assuming 10% Jurors Assuming 20%
Excludables Excludables
X= X=





.949 .778 .511 .030 .007 .951 .782 .517 .032 .007
.967 .835 .599 .051 .013 .977 .877 .671 .077 .022
Difference .018 .057 .088 .021 .006 .026 .085 .154 .045 .015
121. For a similar analysis of the effects of a reduction in jury size on verdicts, see
Lempert, supra note 70, at 681-88. See also Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 237,236-37
(1978).
122. See Cowan, supra note 12, at 68. The reported findings, we should note, are based
on the first-ballot preferences of jurors prior to deliberation. While first-ballot
and final-ballot preferences will probably vary somewhat, first-ballot preferences
appear to be a highly reliable indication of the voting differences among
excludable and includable jurors. Id at 68-69.




Table VI: Probability of Obtaining Acquittal Juror(s)
on Death-Qualified and Non-Qualified Juries (Jurow)123
Probability of X Acquittal Probability of X Acquittal
Jurors Assuming 10% Jurors Assuming 20%
Excludables Excludables
Xy X6+





1.000 .999 .994 .766 .560 1.000 .999 .994 .770 .565
1.000 .999 .995 .790 .591 1.000 .999 .996 .812 .622
Difference - - .001 .024 .031 - - .002 .042 .057
Initially, one might ask whether the probability of obtaining at
least one acquittal juror is the only relevant concern, since it takes but
one juror to prevent conviction. While this probability is relevant, it
fails to take account of the difficulty a lone juror may have in resisting
the persuasions of the eleven remaining jurors. A well-established
finding of past jury research is that a dissenting juror is less likely to
abandon her position when she has one or more confederates.124
Therefore, it may be vital that the defense obtain two or more acquit-
tal jurors on the panel, and a reduction in the likelihood of obtaining
an acquittal onfederate may be strong ground for challenging the pro-
cess of death-qualification.
The research of Cowan, depicted in Table V, reveals that death
qualification may have its greatest effect in reducing the size of acquit-
tal minorities. The first section of Table V assumes that 10 percent of
the relevant jury population consists of excludable jurors. Given such
a population, of whom 24.8 percent are acquittal jurors (the acquittal
rate in Cowan's study population), death qualification has the follow-
ing effects. In approximately two cases in one hundred (.018), death
qualification will eliminate the possibility of at least one acquittal ju-
ror. In approximately six cases in one hundred (.057), death qualifica-
tion will eliminate the possibility of two or more acquittal jurors.
Finally, in approximately nine cases in one hundred (.088), death qual-
ification will eliminate the possibility of three or more acquittal jurors.
Thus, to the extent that "confederates" are needed on the jury to
withstand a conviction majority, Cowan's work suggests that death
qualification will produce an appreciably greater number of convic-
tions. Moreover, the effect increases as the propoftion of excludables
123. Jurow, supra note 12, at 583.




in the community rises to 20 percent: in approximately nine cases in
one hundred (.085), death qualification will eliminate the presence of
at least one acquittal confederate.
The findings based on the research of Cowan represent the effects
of death qualification in cases of the type simulated by Cowan. In this
simulation the overall acquittal rate was 24.8 percent, suggesting a rel-
atively strong case for the state. The strength of the prosecution's case
will obviously vary, however, and this variation will directly affect the
predicted impact of death qualification on acquittal rates.
The importance of case characteristics is illustrated by the findings
of Jurow, Bernard, and Dwyer (hereinafter, Jurow). In the first case
simulation reported by Jurow, majorities of both excludable and in-
cludable jurors thought the accused innocent (67 percent and 56 per-
cent, respectively).125 Table VI demonstrates the possible effects of
death qualification in such a case. As a casual review of that table
reveals, death qualification will probably be inconsequential in cases
like that simulated by Jurow. Regardless of whether one assumes a 10
percent or 20 percent population of excludables, neither the
probability of a single acquittal vote nor that of two or three acquittal
votes varies appreciably: fewer than I percent of all cases will be af-
fected by death qualification.
The hypothetical case of Bernard and Dwyer discloses a related
possibility. That case resulted in acquittal votes from only 12 percent
of excludable jurors and 8 percent of includable jurors, suggesting that
the evidence of guilt was considerable.126 When the jurors were
formed into twelve-person juries for deliberation, no jury voted to ac-
quit.n 7 Although subject to methodological criticism, the research of
Bernard and Dwyer illustrates that, when the evidence of guilt is une-
quivocal, the influence of juror characteristics may be lessened or
eliminated.128
Therefore, one is unable to generalize comfortably about the ef-
fects of death qualification on acquittal rates. Several, highly variable
factors preclude reliable prediction: the proportion of excludable ju-
125. Jurow, supra note 12, at 583.
126. Bernard & Dwyer, supra note 17, at 112.
127. Id. at 111. Of the 15 juries formed by Bernard & Dwyer, 14 voted to convict, while
one "hung."
128. Bernard & Dwyer conclude that excludable and includable jurors are indistin-
guishable, based on the jury voting results described in the text and the statisti-
cally insignificant differences in the voting preferences of individual jurors.
However, three cautionary comments are in order- (1) Bernard & Dwyer's case
was clearly biased in the direction of guilt; (2) one of 15 juries did hang, which
could be suggestive; and (3) excludable jurors were individually less conviction
prone, and the small, "insignificant" differences could possibly become significant
if the study population were enlarged. See Lempert, supra note 70, at 662 n.58
(statistical insignificance may be function of sample size).
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rors in the pertinent community; the magnitude and strength of dif-
ferences between excludable and includable jurors; the size of the
dissenting faction required to withstand a majority willing to convict;
and the strength of the prosecution's case. Yet the empirical evidence
seems too consistent to deny that death qualification will ex propio
vigore alter the outcome in at least some capital cases. Furthermore,
what might be relatively small proportion of cases may constitute a
numerically significant number of capital defendants whose convic-
tions are the incidental product of a jury selection process.12 9
One can also engage in reasoned speculation about the type of case
in which death qualification will work its effect. Death qualification is
likely to be effectual in "close" cases where the acquittal jurors are a
relatively small minority (Cowan's case type, for example).130 In such
cases, the ambiguity of proof may be such that juror traits can influ-
ence verdict choices, and the probability that death qualification will
destroy an acquittal minority is greatest. To some extent, then, the
challenge to death qualification asks how much a criminal justice sys-
tem values the minority perspective.
A further, and somewhat ironic, implication of the research on
death qualification is that the process may pose a greater threat to
those not actually sentenced to death. Many, if not most, capital
sentences result in cases where the evidence of guilt is substantial.1 3 '
Those courts reviewing capital cases show an increasing willingness to
129. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 237-38 (1978) ("Disparities ... appear in only
small percentages. Nationwide, however, these small percentages will represent
a large number of cases. And it is with respect to those cases that the jury trial
right has its greatest value.")
130. As one commentator has noted, most cases are "clear," thus presenting less op-
portunity for jury characteristics to affect verdicts. Lempert, supra note 70, at
648. Drawing on earlier research reported in H. KALvEN & H. ZIEsFEL, THE AMER-
icAN JURY (1966), Lempert estimated that approximately 14 percent of all cases
are "close" ones in which jury characteristics might be influential. Lempert,
supra note 70, at 653. Yet, as noted by Lempert, the actual percentage of cases
where jury characteristics may be influential is probably lower. Id at n.36. On
the other hand, it should be noted that THE AMERICAN JURY reports a larger
percentage of disputed cases (ie., where judge and jury disagree and, presumably,
where decisions may be "close") in homocide trials. H. KALvEN & H. ZEISEL,
supra, at 68-69 (judge and jury agree in 72 percent of all cases, but in only 59
percent of murder cases).
See generally Saks, The Limits of Scientific Jury Selection: Ethical and Em-
pirical, 17 JURiMmics J. 3, 22 (1976) ("If the evidence against a defendant is
very strong or very weak, it isn't going to matter who is on the jury. If the evi-
dence is close, then the jury selection could make the difference.").
131. See Greenberg, Capital Punishment as a System, 91 YALE L.J. 908, 920 (1982)
(citing instances of wrongful conviction); Baldus, Arbitrariness, Discrimination
and Mistake in the Administration of the Death Penalty: A Challenge to State
Supreme Courts (lecture delivered at Stetson University College of Law, Mar. 25,
1985) (few reversals of capital convictions relate to the conviction of the wrong
person).
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recite the often compelling (and grisly) evidentiary records of
guilty. 32 By comparison, capital cases that produce prison sentences
may offer the greatest opportunity for error. It is plausible that juror
characteristics can be particularly influential when juries are asked to
distinguish among the lesser forms of homicide.133 Furthermore,
those sentenced to prison may, as a practical matter, have fewer op-
portunities to challenge trial court error than those who are sentenced
to death,134 thus increasing the risk of uncorrected error.
Accordingly, if the threat of death qualification is present in all
capital cases--and there is no reason to think it is limited to "hard-
core" cases-then the frequent raising of the Witherspoon challenge
by death-row inmates may have miscast the nature of the problem. In
a large sense, death qualification may have more to do with wrongful
prison terms than with wrongful executions. Given the increasing in-
dications that courts have become impatient with the protraction of
capital appeals, it would be unfortunate if the challenge to the process
of death qualification were viewed as "just another" death-row
argument. 3 5
IV. SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON THE CHALLENGE
TO DEATH QUALIFICATION
A. Defining the Category of Excludable Jurors
Contemporary studies of death qualification represent well-
designed efforts to avoid the methodological flaws of earlier research.
The group of excludable jurors has been more narrowly defined, the
standard of exclusion has been more carefully articulated, and the
threats to study validity have been consciously managed.136 Thus, con-
temporary study findings are above much of the methodological reser-
132. See, eg., Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844, 847 (1985); People v. Fields, 35 Cal. 3d
329, 336-40, 673 P.2d 680, 683, 197 Cal. Rptr. 803, 806-09, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 267
(1984).
133. See B. CAnDozo, LAW AND LITERATURE 97-101 (1931) (on the vagueness in the
distinction between first-degree and second-degree murder, and the need to abol-
ish the distinction). See generally W. LOH, supra note 26, at 537-44 (on the diffi-
culty jurors have in remembering and applying legal instructions).
134. See Greenberg, supra note 131, at 913 ("[A]Imost all current capital cases will
receive careful examination in post-trial and post-appellate proceedings.");
Kaplan, The Problem of Capital Punishment, 1983 U. ILL L.F. 555, 572-74 (death
row inmates have greater opportunity, and greater incentive, to challenge their
conviction and sentencing).
135. For a criticism of the Supreme Court's growing insolicitude for capital case de-
fendants, see Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844, 872 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); Dobbert v. Wainwright, 105 S. Ct. 34, 41 n.t (1984) (Marshall J., dissenting)
("The frenzied rush of execution that characterizes this case has become a com-
mon, if Kafkaesque, feature of the Court's capital cases.")
136. See, eg., Cowan, supra note 12, at 73-75.
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vation that justified summary disposition of earlier challenges to death
qualification.
There is growing reason to suspect, however, that extant research
findings may actually understate the magnitude of the problem raised
by death qualification. Recent studies of the process of voir dire in
capital cases, together with changes in the legal standard for excluding
prospective jurors, indicate that the sweep of death qualification may
exceed that previously disclosed.
Contemporary researchers have been careful to define the relevant
group of excludable jurors by their response to a specific question: "Is
your attitude toward the death penalty such that as a juror you would
never be willing to impose it in any case . . . ?"137 By limiting the
category of excludable jurors to those answering "yes" to the above
question, researchers have attempted to avoid the over-inclusiveness
that rendered earlire studies suspect. 3 8 Yet, it has become clear that
the above-quoted inquiry defines too narrowly those jurors who are, in
fact, excluded.
The first evidence that jurors were being excluded under a more
spacious standard was presented in a 1984 study by Erick Schnapper,
Assistant Counsel to the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund.139 Reviewing some fifteen years' use of the Witherspoon stan-
dard of jury qualification, Schnapper discovered that the standard was
neither simply nor clearly applied.140 Instead, Schnapper found that
jurors had been excluded even though their answers to the Wither-
spoon inquiry were indecisive and uncertain, and even though they
vacillated in their statement of opposition to capital punishment.' 4 '
Finding that trial courts were applying the Witherspoon standard for
exclusion too casually, Schnapper urged that exclusion be permitted
only when-in the words of the Witherspoon Court-the juror's in-
ability to impose the death penalty was "unmistakably clear."142
Any hope that the courts might hew to Schnapper's fastidious pro-
posal were dashed in the Court's recent death-qualification decision,
Wainwright v. Witt.143 In Witt, the Court extended broad discretion
137. See, e.g., id at 62; Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, supra note 17, at 40.
138. The research presented in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521-22 (1968), for
example, identified the attitudes and verdict choices of "scrupled" jurors, see
supra note 9, rather than those of the more limited group of excludable jurors.
See studies cited supra note 26. See also Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 236 (8th
Cir. 1985); Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, supra note 17, at 35-36.
139. Schnapper, Taking Witherspoon Seriously: The Search For Death-Qualified Ju-
rors, 62 TEX. L. REv. 977 (1984).
140. "[O]ne recurring and overarching reality is apparent: the attitude of individual
veniremen toward the death penalty is often as uncertain, divided, and wavering
as that of society itself." Id at 1077.
141. Id at 993-1032.
142. Id. at 989-93, 1078.
143. 105 S. Ct. 844 (1985).
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to the trial courts to exclude jurors, based on good sense and intuition,
notwithstanding the juror's inability to declare clearly his capacity to
impose the death penalty.' 44 The merits of the Witt approach to
death qualification are debatable. But it seems likely that Witt will
lead to more conviction-prone panels. Contemporary research on
death qualification is based on a study group defined more narrowly
than in practice or, after Witt, as a matter of law. This more conserva-
tive approach results in an understatement of the effects of death
qualification, since there is ample evidence to suggest that "scrupled"
jurors-those who generally oppose the death penalty but do not ex-
press on unequivocal refusal to impose it-usually share the pro-de-
fendant prespective of excludable jurors.' 45
There remains a second reason to suspect that the effects of death
qualification are not fully captured by the reported research. In a pio-
neer study, Professor Bruce Winick discovered that the formal process
144. After Witt, the standard and the practice of death qualification will be more ex-
pansive. First, a juror who fails to articulate his death penalty attitude with the
"unmistakable clarity" called for in Witherspoon may nonetheless be excluded
when it appears that his attitude will "'prevent or substantially impair the per-
formance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and oath."'
Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844, 846 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S.
38,45 (1980)). Second, a trial judge may exclude when he is "left with the definite
impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially
apply the law." Id. at 853. Moreover, when this impressionistic judgment is
made, "deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror,"
even though the printed record reveals that the juror was uncertain of his disposi-
tion or unable to articulate it. Id
145. There is no available research that measures precisely the difference in the atti-
tudes and conviction rates of scrupled jurors, but there are suggestive findings. In
Jurow's study of "authoritarianism," for example, excludable jurors averaged a
score of 18.7 on a scale of 10-30 (lower numbers suggesting less authoritarianism),
scrupled jurors averaged a score of 21.3, and all other jurors averaged a score of
22.7 (weighted). Jurow, supra note 12, at 587 (Table VI). The same pattern of
attitudinal differences-in which pro-defendant attitudes increase as opposition
to capital punishment increases-can be found in Bronson IH & HI, supra note 17,
at 17, 26, and in Bronson I, supra note 17, at 8. In fact, the three Bronson studies
reveal that scrupled jurors (defined as those who opposed-but not strongly-
capital punishment) have more defendant-prone attitudes on virtually every atti-
tudinal question.
There is similar, though somewhat less compelling evidence regarding the
conviction-proneness of scrupled jurors. In Jurow's simulated cases, one case re-
vealed that scrupled jurors acquitted at a higher rate than both excludable and
non-scrupled jurors, while a second case revealed no significant differences. Ju-
row, supra note 12, at 583. The Harris Study revealed that acquittal votes for
each of four summarized cases increased as the researchers moved from respon-
dents with "low scruples" to those with "medium/low scruples" and "high
scruples." Harris Study, supra note 17, at 35.
Thus, the available evidence seems to suggest clearly that the expansion of
death qualification to exclude those jurors who are scrupled, but who do not ex-
press on unequivocal opposition to the death penalty, will accentuate the anti-
defendant, conviction-proneness of resulting juries.
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of death qualification may be followed by further, informal death
qualification through voir dire. 46 That is, prosecutors appear to use
information obtained during the death qualification process to weed
out scrupled choices by preemptory challenge. In the judicial system
studied by Winick, prosecutors were successful in eliminating almost
all jurors with qualms about the death penalty.147 Of course, it might
be argued that preemptory challenges are freely and equally available
to both the prosecution and the defense, and that the net effect is neu-
tral. This conclusion, however, overlooks the fact that the proportion
of scrupled jurors is often so small that the defense cannot possibly
counterbalance the prosecution's practice through a responsive use of
peremptory challenges. 148 The result is that capital juries will repre-
sent a narrow range of attitudes toward capital punishment, ranging
from supportive to neutral.149
Informal death qualification through peremptory challenges seems
especially unjust given the present power of courts to exclude jurors
based on undifferentiated impressions and intuitions.150 Not only may
the judge err on the side of exclusion, the open-ended process of quali-
fication elicits juror responses from which the prosecution can formu-
late peremptory challenges that directly undermine the original
Witherspoon holding-which stated that the exclusion of scrupled ju-
rors denies capital defendants the right to trial by an impartial jury.'15
Professor Winick's suggested remedy for the abuse of peremptory
challenges, a more narrowly limited inquiry under Witherspoon,152
146. Winick, supra note 43. Winick's five-year study of peremptory practices in one
Florida judicial circuit revealed that 77 percent of all jurors with scruples about
capital punishment were peremptorily challenged by the prosecution, compared
to 28 percent of all non-scrupled jurors. Id. at 35.
147. The prosecution's peremptory practices, it should be noted, followed an even
greater number of prosecutorial challenges for cause (usually of the Witherrpoon
variety). Thus, of the original venire consisting of 147 scrupled jurors, 67 were
successfully challenged for cause by the prosecution, 24 were eliminated for cause
by the courts, and 40 were perempted by the prosecution. By comparison, only
four scrupled jurors were successfully challenged to perempted by the defense.
Id at 30-31.
148. See id at 48-49.
149. In Winick's study-which was conducted in a jurisdiction containing an unusually
low percentage of scrupled jurors (13 percent)-the number of scrupled jurors
remaining for service after death qualification was 6 percent. Id at 30-31.
150. See supra notes 143-145 and accompanying text.
151. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 518-20 (1968).
152. Professor Winick's proposal for a strictly delimited voir dire would seem incom-
patible with the unstructured, impressionistic process outlined in Witt See supra
note 144. Winick also recommended that, in jurisdictions where the guilt and
sentencing phases are separate, pre-trial voir dire be limited to the determination
of a juror's ability to judge guilt impartially-leaving to after trial the death qual-
ification of the sentencing jury. Winick, supra note 43, at 87. This deferral of
death qualification is, of course, the remedy sought in the present challenge to
death qualification. See, e.g., Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 243 (8th Cir. 1985).
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has been foreclosed by the court's decision in Witt. Yet, there is an
alternative remedy that may reduce substantially the opportunity for
abuse of peremptory challenges, while preserving the opportunity for
legitimate use of those challenges. Death qualification could be re-
served until after the completion of non-Witherspoon voir dire and
the exercise of peremptory challenges. The process of circumventing
Witherspoon through peremptory challenges will seldom be possible
if peremptories are exercised in ignorance of a juror's attitude toward
capital punishment. In effect, the prosecution and the defense would
exercise peremptory challenges based on full disclosure of the type of
information typically elicited during non-capital voir dires.153 Death
qualification itself would be the special province of the trial court un-
supplemented by additional peremptory challenges.
The proposed remedy would not, admittedly, be a perfect pallia-
tive. Death qualification is an inexact process, and occasionally there
may be excludable jurors who elude the process of detection. Yet, to
the extent that peremptories are intended to provide a margin of error
for correcting mistakes in jury qualification, the broad Witt standard
for death qualification seems already to have created a margin of error
favoring the prosecution. It will probably be the infrequent occasion
when disclosure of a juror's attitude toward capital punishment serves
any peremptory purpose other than the circumvention of
Witherspoon.154
But even if the Supreme Court were to adopt the Grigsby position, there would
remain the problem of prosecutors' discovering scrupled jurors through the
search for nullifiers. The continuing potential for abuse is illustrated by the voir
dire quoted in Witt, which lead to the disqualification of a juror incapable of adju-
dicating guilt impartially. Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844, 848 (1985). We sug-
gest that all peremptory challenges should be used before any form of death
qualification occurs.
153. As the Court has noted, there is no constitutional right to the use of peremptory
challenges. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965). Thus, to the extent
that this discretionary practice creates the opportunity for infringement of consti-
tutional values, it can be modified. Of course, if defense counsel should conclude
that ordinary peremptory practice is in his client's best interests, there is on rea-
son why the option of modifying peremptory practices cannot be waived.
154. In actuality, prosecutorial abuse of peremptory challenges may serve two illegiti-
mate purposes: first, the circumvention of Witherspoon by eliminating scrupled
jurors from the prospective sentencing phase; and second, the elimination of de-
fendant-prone jurors from the guilt-adjudication phase. Lest this inference ap-
pear too cynical, consider the following quote from Grigsby:
It should be noted here that as soon as the prosecutor got a "guilty"
verdict he waived the death penalty. Why? If he knew from the begin-
ning that he would not press for the death penalty, then one could argue
that he first stated that the state would seek the death penalty in order
to get a "death qualified" jury, one that he felt would more likely convict
than a non-death qualified jury.
Grigsby v. Mabry, 483 F. Supp. 1372, 1389, n.24 (E.D. Ark. 1980), amended, 569 F.
Supp. 1273 (1983), affid, 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985).
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The proposed remedy for abuse of peremptory challenges might
also be questioned because it does not fully foreclose the opportunity
for abuse by savvy attorneys. There may be substance to this objection
insofar as the proposed remedy is imperfect. Doubtlessly, some cun-
ning attorneys will develop circumspect means of eliciting information
that suggests the juror's attitude toward capital punishment. And the
proposed remedy would clearly require more careful monitoring of
voir dire by the court. Yet, it would seem that opposing counsel at-
tuned to the possibility of circumspection can provide an important
check to such abuse. Furthermore, it should be recalled that the atti-
tudes and characteristics of excludable jurors are not homogeneous.55
Accordingly, the attempt to infer the death-qualified status of prospec-
tive jurors through indirect questioning may be less promising than
one might initially think.
Curtailing the potential for abuse of death qualification through
peremptory challenges will not obviate all, or even most, injurious ef-
fects alleged to result from death qualification. But restrictions on
peremptory challenges would at least remove the taint of knowing
governmental manipulation of capital juries, and would do so with few
incidental effects. In addition, restrictions on peremptory challenges
would somewhat reduce the possibility that the worst potential of
death qualification will be realized.
B. The Normative Issues Posed by Death Qualification
The empirical challenge to death qualification may present the
most complex socio-legal claims yet addressed by the courts. As
demonstrated earlier, uncertainty inheres in every aspect of the capi-
tal jury's operation, whether one focuses on the method of identifying
excludable jurors or the deliberate process through which verdicts are
reached. So it is that, some seventeen years after Witherspoon, no
definitive conclusions can be stated as to the frequency or the magni-
tude of the effects of death qualification.
Yet, it is hardly characteristic for courts to demand dispositive em-
pirical evidence before acting upon behavioral assumptions. Constitu-
tional jurisprudence is replete with behavioral premises less tested
than the hypothesis of death qualification. The results and precepts of
prior restraint, 56 police interrogation,1 5 7 evidentiary exclusion,158 and
155. See supra text accompanying note 64.
156. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (chilling effect of pre-trial gag
orders).
157. Miranda v. Arizona, 348 U.S. 486 (1966) (coercive effect of custodial interrogations
without warning of rights). See generally Comment, Interrogations in New Ha-
ven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519 (1967).
158. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule). See
[Vol. 64:21
EMPIRICAL CHALLENGE
school desegregation159 are but a few illustrations of the Supreme
Court's propensity to transform behavioral suspicions into doctrine.
In fact, the challenge to death qualification presents the uncommon
situation where courts have the opportunity to formulate constitu-
tional standards after the behavioral premises have been investigated.
Nor is it likely that further empirical research can add significantly
to the current understanding of death qualification. The true magni-
tude of the phenomenon of conviction proneness is probably un-
measurable,160 given the complexity of capital cases and capital
adjudication. A certain amount of judicial conjecture is needed, even
if it is a more informed sort than that to which courts are accustomed.
What does remain for resolution are normative questions, for
which courts are aptly suited. In its largest sense, the challenge to
death qualification asks what pains the criminal justice system is will-
ing to take to avoid convictions that are the incidental product of state
insistence that capital juries have potential to impose the death pen-
alty. The argument against death qualification appears to rest on one
of the most hallowed of our legal tenets: that neither procedural con-
venience nor law enforcement should be exulted over the protection
of the unjustly accused.s16 So characterized, the argument seems
compelling.
Further examination, however, reveals that the challenge is a more
subtle and less reflexive one. The current safeguards that accompany
capital trials and appeals are the most elaborate of our criminal justice
system.162 Jurors, in particular, are selected with inordinate care,163
and a host of procedural and evidentiary restrictions insure that the
potential for juror error is minimized.164 Furthermore, the opportuni-
ties for detection of "error," as it is understood by the courts, are nu-
merous and repetitive.165  Thus, even if death-qualified juries
generally Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule. Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62 Ju-
DICATURE 214 (1978).
159. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (injurious effects of segregated
schools). See generally McConahay, The Effects of School Desegregation Upon
Students'Racial Attitudes and Behavior: A Critical Review of the Literature and
a Prolegomenon to Future Research, 42 L. & CoNTEMP. PRoBS. 77 (1978).
160. In Keeten v. Garrison, 578 F. Supp. 1164 (W.D.N.C.), rev'd, 742 F.2d 129 (4th Cir.
1984), expert testimony was offered in an attempt to quantify the impact of death
qualification. Predictably, experts for the two sides differed sharply in their as-
sumptions and in their predictions of impact. As to consequence, the district
court did not rest its opinion on specific findings of impact. Id. at 1185-86.
161. See, e.g., Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 139 (1979); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S.
223, 244 (1978).
162. See generally Kaplan, supra note 134, at 571-76.
163. Id. at 571 (citing evidence that jury selection takes more than four times longer in
capital cases).
164. See generally Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respectfor Persons: Super Due Pro-
cessfor Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143 (1980).
165. Kaplan, supra note 134, at 572-73.
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occasionally produce different verdicts, there is arguably no reason to
impeach those verdicts in the absence of legally cognizable error that
suggests those verdicts may be flawed.
Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor have suggested that challenges
to death qualification should, in fact, be accompanied by proof of ac-
tual prejudice.166 But if this were to be adopted as a legal standard,
the empirical challenge to death qualification would be effectively
rendered moot. Specific explanations for the phenomenon of convic-
tion proneness are as yet inadequate. Many of the tentative explana-
tions-that death-qualified jurors are more credulous of the
prosecution's evidence, or that they accept a lower threshold for the
prosecution's burden of proof1_67-would be undemonstrable in a par-
ticular case even if one were able to determine that a particular state
of credulity was "error." Furthermore, if death qualification works its
effect in close cases, there will usually be evidentiary ground for sus-
taining trial court verdicts. In short, situational prejudice will usually
be undetectable.
More importantly, the challenge to death qualification is princi-
pally a challenge to different, as distinguished from wrongful, ver-
dicts. An inherent feature of our jury system is that two certifiably
impartial juries may differ in their assessment of guilt, and that differ-
ence may result from distinctions in the makeup of the two juries. In
the absence of conventional legal error, either verdict is final and ac-
cepted regardless of its metaphysical correctness. But, while jury vari-
ation is tolerable in our semi-randomized system of juror selection, it
may not be when variation results from the systematic, tendentious
screening of jurors.
In the last analysis, the challenge to convictions produced by death
qualification is entwined inextricably with the challenge to the repre-
sentativeness of death-qualified juries. Alone, either the fair-cross-
section or the conviction-proneness argument can be parsed to the
point where no "compelling" legal cause is stated. It does not seem
that death qualification leads to legally significant underrepresenta-
tion of blacks, women, or civil libertarians, even though it is clear that
166. Woodard v. Hutchins, 104 S. Ct. 752, 754 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). The
position of Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor seems in conflict with the Court's
earlier holdings, which require no showing of actual prejudice when the defend-
ant has been convicted by an unconstitutionally-composed jury. See, e.g., Duren
v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 368 (1978); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223,244-45 (1978).
167. The most sophisticated research to date can be found in Cowan, supra note 12.
This research disclosed that death-qualified juries tend to be more impressed
with prosecution witnesses, tend to be less stringent in the application of the rea-
sonable doubt standard, and tend to produce less information and debate during
deliberation. Id at 69-73, 75-76. The differences reported by Cowan, though sta-
tistically significant at times, were not overwhelming in magnitude; thus, the
findings can only be viewed as suggestive at this point.
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all three groups are diminished by the process. Nor can it be said that
death qualification greatly increases the risk of wrongful convictions,
even though it seems clear that an appreciable number of convictions
can be traced to the process.
Thus, the conviction proneness of death-qualified juries is objec-
tionable, not so much because it produces errant verdicts, but because
the resulting verdicts may be traced to alterations in the community
mix on juries. This is a point over which several circuit court panels
continue to trip in their insistence that an apparently "impartial" jury
verdict by a death-qualified jury is constitutionally firm. 168 The point
is that the accused is entitled to trial by an impartial jury, fortuitiously
selected (for the most part), and free of systematic selection biases
that increase the odds against her. The constitutional norm in crimi-
nal juries is, mutatis mutandis, the community as is.
If it is conceded that death qualification compromises the right to a
jury trial by some unmeasurable extent, if is incumbent upon the state
to justify the practice. Since all concede that death qualification must
occur at some trial stage before the sentence can be determined, the
state's principal contention must be that the present scheme is the
only feasible one. One claim raised by the lower courts, that death
qualification may be in the defendant's best interests, seems specious
unless the state is willing to grant the defendant the option to waive
this paternalistic protection in exchange for better odds aginst
conviction.169
168. See, ag., Rowan v. Owens, 752 F.2d 1186, 1190 (7th Cir. 1984); Keeten v. Garrison,
742 F.2d 129, 134 (4th Cir. 1984); Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573, 578 (5th Cir.
1981), modified, 671 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1982). This position is soundly rebutted in
Winick, supra note 43, at 59-60. See also Grigsby v. Mabry, 578 F.2d 226, 241-42
(8th Cir. 1985).
169. See, e.g., Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1981), modified, 671 F.2d 858
(5th Cir. 1982); People v. Fields, 35 Cal. 3d 329, 352, 673 P.2d 680, 694, 197 Cal.
Rptr. 803, 817, cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 267 (1984). The court in Smith opined that
members of the jury determining guilt might, after convicting the defendant of
first-degree murder, contain "whimsical doubt" about their decision that could
carry over to the penalty phase. These jurors, the argument goes, would be less
likely to sentence the defendant to death. The original court in Smith could cite
no evidence to support its theory. Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573, 581 (5th Cir.
1981).
There are several dubious aspects to this argument. First, the court assumes
that the sentencing jury would consist of completely new members; other courts
have assumed that only the excludable jurors would be replaced at the sentencing
phase. See, e.g., Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 243 (8th Cir. 1985); Keeten v.
Garrison, 578 F. Supp. 1164, 1186 (W.D.N.C.), rev'd, 742 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1984).
Thus, it is plausible that those jurors serving during both phases--who have
themselves entertained "whimsical doubt" during jury deliberations-could mod-
erate the sentencing decision. Second, if the evidence in the case raises doubts
about conviction, this is precisely where a defendant might desire a less convic-
tion-prone excludable juror at the guilt-determination phase. See supra text ac-
companying note 124. The trade-off suggested by the court-a more conviction-
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A more plausible state justification can be drawn from historical
practice. The process of death qualification arose in a era when the
death sentence followed automatically from conviction for a capital
crime. Death qualification served the salutary function of screening
out "nullifiers," who might acquit the guilty in order to avoid the non-
discretionary infliction of a death penalty.170 The modern fear, ex-
pressed by one appellate court, is that excludable jurors might be sur-
reptitious nullifiers who elude detection at voir dire.171
The claim that death qualification is needed to screen further for
nullifiers, whatever is historical status, has been undermined by the
decision in Wainwright v. Witt.172 In Witt, the Court has sanctioned
broad trial court discretion-trial courts may play their numbers-in
screening capital opponents. 17 3 Any doubts that a juror can adjudicate
the case impartially may be resolved against qualification, thereby
eliminating the need for secondary screening mechanisms. Further-
more, it seems somewhat disingenuous to grasp at the unproven as-
sumption that excludable jurors are latent nullifiers as a means of
rebutting the confirmed phenomenon of conviction proneness.
The remaining justification for the present scheme of death qualifi-
cation seems to be the unknown procedural costs that will result if
excludable jurors are not removed until after the guilt determination
phase is concluded.174 This change would probably necessitate the use
of alternate jurors, who would be substituted at the sentencing
phase. 7 5 Although the use of alternate jurors is established practice
in most jiuisdictions,176 one cannot predict the consequences of routin-
izing this practice in all capital cases. Yet, it seems evident that such
administrative trepidation alone cannot justify resistance to reform, if
the proven cost of the present system is the constitutionally infirm
conviction of capital defendants.177 The deferral of death qualification
until after guilt is determined, like other procedural innovations, will
prone jury for a less death-prone jury-seems one that the accused is unlikely to
make. In any event, if it is a tradeoff that the accused should have the discretion
to make.
170. See generally Oberer, supra note 12, at 549-52; White, supra note 10, at 354-57.
171. Keeten v. Garrison, 742 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1984). Accord People v. Fields, 35 Cal.
3d 329, 352, 673 P.2d 680, 694, 197 Cal. Rptr. 803, 817 (1984).
172. 105 S. Ct. 844 (1985). See supra text accompanying notes 143-45.
173. See supra text accompanying note 144.
174. See, e.g., People v. Fields, 35 Cal. 3d 329, 352, 673 P.2d 680, 694, 197 Cal. Rptr. 803,
817 (1984).
175. Id. See also Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 243 (8th Cir. 1985).
176. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 24 (on the use of alternate jurors).
177. See, e.g., Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 244 (1978). See generally Winick supra
note 43, at 58. Both the courts and the commentators have questioned whether
changes in jury practice in the relatively small number of capital cases will actu-
ally produce great administrative cost and inconvenience. See e.g., Grigsby v. Ma-
bry, 758 F.2d 226, 243 (8th Cir. 1985); White, supra note 10, at 400.
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eventually be assimilated into trial practice; any imagined problems
can be dealt with as they materialize.
Thus, the critical question in the challenge to death qualification is
whether courts will recognize the empirical evidence that establishes a
constitutional violation. This is by no means clear. As one commenta-
tor has observed, empirical challenges to the death penalty tend to
invite the clash of experts, and the confusion of voices, that make
courts reluctant to act on the strength of social science evidence.1 7 8
The evidence on death qualification is peculiarly subject to this dispu-
tation, since the alleged faults with the process are not the palpable,
predictable stuff with which courts are accustomed to dealing. Like
sub-atomic particles or some unisolated bacteria, the effects of death
qualification elude precise description or quantification. It is just such
effects that courts might fail to see.
The effort to discern the elusive effects of death qualification also
has the potential to obscure the courts' larger vision of the extensive
juror manipulation that is part of our present system. Winick's re-
search on the peremptory practices of prosecutors only confirmed
what was suspected long before Witherspoon: the state is highly sus-
picious of jurors with scruples about capital punishment, and intent
upon ridding them from capital juries.179 Indeed, it takes one with the
credulity of the Queen in Through the Looking Glass-who made a
habit of believing several impossible things before breakfast each
morningiSO-to take seriously the state's current contention that ex-
cludable jurors are otherwise fungible with qualified jurors. The
state's own practice belies its claim.
It must also be remembered that the screening of excludable jurors
is preceded by an often extensive disqualification of "nullifiers,"181
those jurors whose opposition to capital punishment is so great that
they could not participate in any aspect of capital adjudication. These
nullifiers, concededly, cannot serve on capital juries.1 8 2 Yet, the social
science commentators have too easily conceded that these nullifiers
can be ignored in assessing the practical consequences of death qualifi-
cation. Like the screening of excludable jurors, the screening of nulli-
fiers decimates the representation of protected juror groups and
constricts the presence of more defense-prone jurors. 8 3 The "unfit-
178. See Daniels, Social Science and Death Penalty Cases: Reflections on Change and
the Empirical Just ifwation of Constitutional Policy, 1 L. & POL'y Q. 336, 336-41
(1979).
179. See supra text accompanying notes 143-54.
180. L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLAss (1898).
181. See supra note 9.
182. See ic.
183. This effect is illustrated by the Precision Research Survey, supra note 17, which
was used in Grigsby. That survey disclosed that 36 percent of blacks would be
eliminated as nullifiers, compared to only 9 percent of whites. I& at 20. Further-
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ness" of these jurors for service, moreover, results from an individual
conscience that, in non-capital cases, constitutes a cherished and ser-
viceable part of the jury's conscience. The social cost of these jurors'
loss should not be overlooked when interpreting the effects of death
qualification, even if these jurors lack legal cognizability.
V. CONCLUSION
The death qualification of excludable jurors, therefore, is but one
facet of a larger system that produces capital juries looking nothing
like the community from which they are drawn. So long as death is an
unacceptable criminal penalty to substantial segments of our society,
some skewing of juries through death qualification will continue. But
it is one thing for our courts to bow to necessity, and quite another for
them to over-imagine what is necessary. Put simply, the current pro-
cess of death qualification has yet to justify itself, and that is a burden
that the system should carry.
more, the survey revealed that most nullifiers are strongly opposed to capital
punishment. Id at 18. As indicated earlier, strong opponents of capital punish-
ment usually express the more pro-defendant attitudes, and usually show less
tendency to convict. See supra notes 59 & 61. Thus, the logical (and common-
sensical) inference is that the elimination of nullifiers will magnify those injuri-
ous effects produced by the screening of excludable jurors.
Furthermore, the dilution of community representation must be understood
in the context of the common underrepresentation of minorities and women on
jury selection lists. The extensive evidence confirming guch underrepresentation
is summarized in J. VANDYKE, supra note 87, at 23-43. Vandyke notes that "non-
whites are underrepresented on juries in the vast majority of courts in this coun-
try." Id. at 28. Vandyke also notes that 88.9 percent of jury service surveys find





(1) In determining the percentage reduction in attitudes, supra Ta-
ble II, and in acquittal votes, supra Table IV, resulting from
death qualification, the following formula was used:
p = percentage of death-qualified jurors with attitude/char-
acteristic
r = percentage of death-qualified jurors in population
x = percentage of excludable jurors with attitude/character-
istic
y = percentage of excludable jurors in population
D = difference in makeup of death-qualified and non-quali-
fied juries.
D = p - [(p - r) + (x -y)]
By way of illustration, Fitzgerald and Ellsworth report that 32.3
percent of death-qualified jurors agree that "failure to testify in-
dicates guilt." By comparison, 23.5 percent of excludable jurors
so believe. Thus, assuming excludable jurors constitute 20 per-
cent of the jury population, the attitudinal effect of death qualifi-
cation is as follows:
D = .323 - [(.323 -. 80) + (.235. .20)]
= .323 - [(.2584) + (.047)]
= .323 - .305
= .018
= 1.8%
(2) In determining the probabilities of the appearance of an atti-
tude,1 8 4 or the appearance of an acquittal vote, 8 5 the following
binominal probability distributionla6 was used:
p(y) = probability of selecting "y" number of jurors with
designated characteristic on twelve-person jury.
n = number of jurors per jury (12).
p = percentage of jurors in entire population with
designated characteristic.




Of course, the pertinent empirical question in the study of jury impact
is whether a twelve-person jury will have at least a minimum number
184. See supra text accompanying notes 70-72.
185. See supra text accompanying note 122.
186. See generally W. MENDENHALL, supra note 65, at 173-75.
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of jurors with a designated characteristic. That is, if two acquittal ju-
rors are thought necessary to avoid a conviction, the pertinent issue is
the probability that a particular twelve-person jury will have two,
three, etc., jurors, as distinct from no or only one acquittal juror. The
probability of having at least two acquittal jurors can thus be deter-
mined in the following way:
Pr (two or more acquitters) = 1 - Pr (no acquitter) - Pr (one
acquitter) 8 7
By way of illustration, assume that 74.8 percent of the jurors in a
population disfavor the insanity defense. The probability of finding
one such juror on a randomly-selected twelve-person jury is calculated
as follows:
Pr (1 or more jurors disfavoring insanity plea) = 1 -
Pr (no juror disfavoring insanity plea).
-1- 12! (.748)0 (.252)32
0!(12-0)!
- .999997
The probability that at least two jurors will disfavor the insanity
defense is calculated as follows:
Pr (2 or more jurors) = 1 - Pr (no juror) - Pr (onejuror)
12!
- 1 - (0) 12! (.748)' (.252)"
1! (129-1)!
= .999997
187. See id. at 175. See generally M. SPIEGEL, STATISTICS 99-104, 115 (1961); Lempert,
supra note 70, at 643.
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